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REALISTIC COMBAT TRAINING OF MOTORIZED INFANTRYMEN DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 22 May 78 pp 3-4

[Article by Lt Col G. Kuvitanov: "Facing Danger"]

[Text] It is difficult to simulate the conditions of actual combat in the process of daily training. Nevertheless units persistently seek opportunities and capabilities to create situations where personnel develop the ability to withstand protracted neuropsychological stress loads and excessive tension. Enemy employment of nuclear weapons is simulated at training drills and exercises, there is the sudden occurrence of fires, physical destruction, structural collapse and extensive flooding zones. "Aggressor" tanks counterattack motorized riflemen, drive over their foxholes, while the motorized riflemen in turn, waiting for the tanks to pass overhead, lob grenades at them. Artillery crews fire live rounds over the heads of troops advancing behind a rolling barrage. Close-support aircraft conduct intensive bombing, strafing with rockets, clearing the path for tanks and motorized infantrymen.

With the entire aggregate of psychological preparation experienced commanders develop in their men preparedness for self-sacrificing performance of complex combat missions and the endeavor to achieve victory over the enemy at any cost. In this article we shall discuss the actions of military personnel under conditions of heavy neuropsychological and physical stresses.

The attack began immediately following a nuclear "strike." Tanks, followed by infantry combat vehicles, rushed forward at maximum speed from the final coordination line toward the "enemy's" forward position, which at that moment was being hit by artillery, firing over the heads of the attacking troops. The air was filled with the thunder of shellbursts. A wall of black smoke and dust rose up ahead, along the line of the defending force's forward trench. Jet aircraft screamed low overhead and literally within seconds discharged their bomb load on the designated target.

The wave of attacking troops advanced toward the "enemy's" forward position. The shells fired by the supporting batteries were bursting only a few hundred meters forward of the tanks. Soon the rolling barrage advanced deep into the defense. The tank crews and infantry combat vehicles engaged surviving targets at the forward edge of the battle area.

"Emplaced tank in middle of yellowish brush, destroy with concentrated fire!" platoon leader Guards Warrant Officer V. Dorofeyev radioed a command.

Prior to receiving this command the infantry combat vehicle crews were doing a pretty good job, and it seemed that the assault phase would run smoothly. But delivery of fire on the emplaced tank became more difficult. The gunners noted something wrong through their gunsights: local objects, reference points, and the target at which the platoon was to open fire -- everything flashed and began hopping in a kind of haze. The platoon leader himself, Warrant Officer Dorofeyev, also would occasionally lose sight of the target.

He pressed the gas mask eyepieces more tightly to the observation instrument and immediately realized what was happening: everything around was burning -- the ground, fallen branches and tree trunks, dry grass, the "aggressor" combat vehicle mock-ups, and bridge structures.... There was fire to the left, to the right, and ahead. A large area was on fire. The left-flank vehicle immediately reduced speed, followed by the command vehicle. Only the infantry combat vehicle of Gds Sgt N. Smirenko, driven by experienced driver Gds Pfc M. Kolyada, maintained the specified rate of advance.

"Increase speed, intensify observation," the platoon leader ordered.

He now had a clear comprehension of the developing situation: the motorized riflemen, entering the nuclear "burst" area behind the tanks, were in a zone of fire. A critical moment for the platoon had arrived. Would the guardsmen be able to maintain their self-control, combat activeness, would they be able to complete the assigned mission -- this was what concerned the platoon leader.

Long before the subunit went out into the field for the tactical exercise, much was done to have personnel gain a correct picture of the nature of combat actions with enemy employment of mass destruction weapons. At all practice drills, with simulation both of the weapons themselves and the external picture of the consequences of weapon utilization, confidence in capability to accomplish assigned missions was instilled in the motorized infantry, as well as in the reliability of the protective properties of their equipment, field fortifications and individual protective gear. They developed firm skills in negotiating extensive zones "contaminated" by radioactive substances or in flames, without diminished combat activeness. This developed courage, self-mastery, and the ability to operate for an extended period of time in individual protective gear.

Conducting a drill on protection against mass destruction weapons, Warrant Officer Dorofeyev gave a detailed description of the casualty-producing elements of these weapons, discussed and subsequently demonstrated methods of effective protection against them. The trainees thoroughly mastered the part on theory, which could be determined on the basis of their precise answers. But when it came time to drill on putting out fires, many of the men, including excellent-rated performers, displayed timidity and confusion.

The platoon leader ignited specially-prepared manikins. The men rushed toward them with ponchos. One of the men, instead of covering the manikin with a poncho and pressing it tight to shut off oxygen, merely touched the flame with the edge of the poncho. The soldier withdrew from the flame. The warrant officer was well aware that the reason for the halting actions by this man was his poor psychological conditioning and a lack of firm skills in putting out fires. Dorofeyev demonstrated once more how to extinguish the fire on a burning manikin, after which the riflemen also successfully accomplished the task.

The training drill became more complicated. The warrant officer proceeded to teach his men quickly to extinguish clothing which may ignite from the luminous radiation of a nuclear burst. The platoon's motorized riflemen saw their commander's clothing ignite. The commander flung himself onto the ground and, with a precisely-calculated movement, pressed firmly against the ground that part of his body where the clothing had ignited. Within 4 to 5 seconds Dorofeyev quickly rose to his feet as if nothing had happened. The psychological tension in his trainees immediately relaxed, and smiles appeared on their faces. The skilled methods specialist immediately reinforced the visual effect on his men -- he repeated the fire-extinguishing technique in the same manner. But on this occasion he spent even less time. The men immediately gained faith in the effectiveness and reliability of the demonstrated technique.

The psychological conditioning of the young guardsmen increased from one drill session to the next, and their skills in protection against mass destruction weapons were becoming more solid. It is true that unforeseen incidents did occur. For example, young driver Pvt R. Vakhitov was driving his infantry combat vehicle not too skillfully when it was necessary to drive the vehicle over manned foxholes under smoke conditions (a zone of physical destruction and fires from a nuclear burst were being simulated). He was afraid that he would crush men in the trenches. Then he himself was ordered to take one of the foxholes. Soon an infantry combat vehicle and tank passed swiftly overhead, and he became convinced of the total safety of the men.

Some of the men were not psychologically prepared to employ live grenades in the attack. When Warrant Officer Dorofeyev informed his men that at the exercise they would be using pocket "artillery," one of the men stated: "Let the veterans use them, but give us novices inert practice grenades." In order to still the men's doubts, the platoon leader carefully prepared for and conducted a grenade drill. First they studied the construction of a grenade, its specifications, performance characteristics and safety procedures. Then they went out to the range. The warrant officer, paired with young soldier N. Vasil'yev, went first. This had a positive effect on the others. The entire platoon successfully performed live grenade throwing.

But let us return to the guardsmen's attack.

"Emplaced tank spotted, 400," gunner Pvt V. Korobchenko reported the target designation. Setting the sight, he commanded: "Short halt!"

Driver Pvt Kh. Karimov stopped the vehicle smoothly but swiftly. The gun boomed. The shell trace passed through the target square.

The trenches of the defending force were under the treads of the infantry combat vehicles. Private Karimov, that same soldier who in the past would become confused in such a situation and would slow down, maintained speed.

The further the motorized infantrymen advanced into the "enemy" defenses, the more intense combat became. Skillfully combining fire and movement and working in precise coordination with adjacent units and the advancing tanks, they hit targets with accuracy and promptly squelched any "enemy" move. When the contaminated area had been crossed and the crews removed their protective gear, it seemed that things would let up. But they did not. The subunit unexpectedly encountered strong resistance at an intermediate point. It was necessary to continue the attack dismounted. When they would approach to a point 25-30 meters from a trench, the motorized infantrymen would throw live grenades at the "enemy" infantry in the trenches. This was followed by another situation complication: the "adversary" had initiated a sudden tank counterattack on the flank. Once again the guardsmen kept their composure. Pvts I. Varchenko, S. Sabitov and S. Kolobov accurately hit their targets at long range with rocket launchers. A critical moment in the engagement occurred on the platoon's right flank, where two tanks succeeded in breaking through. In this situation the command took all security measures. The squad under the command of young Sergeant Smirenko performed selflessly and courageously in a dangerous situation. One tank was heading straight for the squad leader. The sergeant readied a grenade and lay prone so as to end up between the treads under the advancing vehicle. Allowing the tank to move over him, Smirenko quickly rose up and threw the grenade with precision onto the transmission compartment.

The engagement of the second tank proved even more difficult. An umpire, seeing that squad machinegunner Pvt M. Agashin was preparing to follow his squad leader's example, introduced a scenario change: "The squad has run out of grenades!"

The squad leader gave the following command to Private Agashin and automatic rifleman G. Shayunov: "Blind the tank!"

The two guardsmen nimbly clambered onto the tank and covered the crew's observation instruments with ponchos. The tank halted.

This tactical exercise left the guardsmen with an acute emotional impression. They had experienced many difficulties on the road to victory. And this road was constructed in combat not only by the firepower and superior maneuverability of the infantry combat vehicles but also thanks to a high degree of psychological preparedness -- a weapon of particular force.

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COMBAT TRAINING OF SMALL TANK UNITS DESCRIBED

Tank Platoon Training Methods Described

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 22 May 78
pp 4-6

[Article by Lt Col B. Gudymenko: "The Tanks Advance — On Methodology for Conducting a Tactical Training Period"]

[Text] The tactical training of small tank units begins, of course, with training crews and developing working harmony. The best conditions for training tank troops are created at tactical training periods where they practice deployment in battle formations, attacking at top speed, repulsing counterattacks, pursuing an enemy, digging in on occupied lines, and the like.

Before beginning preparation for the training period the platoon leader studies the topic and training questions from the combat training program and company schedule. Then he determines the training objective, order of work on questions, time, and logistics appropriate to the topic and level of troop training and prepares himself personally.

The platoon leader outlines the training area on a map or diagram and works out the conception of the period and plan for conducting it, which gives the topic, objective, time, logistical support, and course of the training period in graphic form. The training leader shows the starting position (trench or strongpoint), the fire positions of anti-tank weapons, mortars, artillery, antitank obstacles, and the closest reserves in depth in the crew's sector of action. At the same time he designates his forward edge, starting positions, line of deployment for the attack, and the missions of the platoon and company. He sketches the approximate order of crew actions in response to inputs during the attack, battle in depth, repulsion of counterattacks, crossing contaminated sectors, and the like.

At the site the commander studies the terrain in detail, arranges elements of the enemy battle formation (target situation) on lines in

conformity with the conception and the equipment available at the tactical training field, and makes provision for simulating actions. It is very important that an active enemy be simulated; this makes the situation more complex and forces personnel to operate with decisiveness and initiative.

A variety of targets on the training field and skillful simulation of fire stimulate crews to maintain constant surveillance and determine the initial settings for firing; thus, they will be inclined to make sound decisions concerning use of the terrain, firepower, and maneuverability of the vehicle and when giving commands and target indications.

In modern combat the field of battle is saturated by various types of engineering and explosive obstacles. Therefore, the training leader must teach crews to cross them quickly and skillfully, combining fire with movement, and to show strong qualities of will.

The success of a training period depends significantly on personnel's precise knowledge of the tactical-technical characteristics of their weapons and those of the enemy, an understanding of the character of modern combat, an ability to operate quickly in a changing situation, and the use of weapons of mass destruction.

For this reason, during preparation for the training period it is essential during hours of regular classes and independent study for tank forces to study the appropriate articles of the regulations, manuals, and handbooks, repeat the organization and tactics of subunits of the probable enemy, and perform a few tactical missions on a mock-up of the terrain with a representation of the tactical situation.

In modern battle a tank crew performs actions of various types: attack, defense, march, reconnaissance, and others. All of these questions are treated at tactical training periods. In the case we are considering the topic was "The Tank on the Advance."

On the day before the training period platoon leader WO [Praporshchik] D. Davydkov conducted theoretical and battle drill exercises on this topic and, in addition, had an instructional methods class with sergeants. The equipment was prepared for operations on rugged terrain in a complex situation.

All instructions and oral inputs to the tank commander must, of course, arrive in the same way they do in battle, which is to say by radio. So the warrant officer made provision for a portable radio set. Because the commander cannot be in the tank with the trainees he was assigned a motor vehicle. He did not forget the training package of artillery shells and grenades to be used to teach the fighting men to load ammunition into the tank and drill them on loading the weapon.

At 0900 the crew fell in by the tank. Warrant Officer Davydkov announced the subject, the purpose of the training period, and the

training questions: preparation of the vehicle for battles; movement to the assault position line; attacking the forward edge of the enemy defense; actions during the advance (crossing antitank obstacles, swift advance and wiping out the enemy with fire and tracks; repulsing a counterattack by infantry reinforced by tanks, pursuing the retreating enemy, and crossing a "contaminated" sector); crew actions when the tank is damaged.

After this the warrant officer introduced the trainees to the situation, announced that the tank was in the assembly area, and related the warning signals.

For 30 minutes the platoon leader taught the crew how to organize work during technical inspection of the vehicle and loading ammunition; they also worked on checking sighting attachments using a check target.

At 0930 Warrant Officer Davydkov gave the crew its combat mission by map. In this he told them the mission of the company and platoon, the object of attack, and the warning and control signals.

Tank commander Jr Sgt I. Khismatulin took the reports of crew members on the vehicle's readiness for battle, reported this to the warrant officer, and gave the order to move to the deployment line. Remembering that it is essential to operate quickly and decisively at the assault position line, particularly because the enemy was carrying on artillery fire against the attackers, the platoon leader modified the tank's mission by radio. The crew opened fire on the run against antitank weapons located in the axis of movement. Warrant Officer Davydkov gave the position of neighboring tanks by radio input.

The tank crossed the minefield following a marked, prepared passage with fire support from adjacent vehicles. At this moment other enemy weapons and manpower were revealed. A tank in a trench, an antitank gun, and a machine gun opened fire. These targets were at different distances so that Junior Sergeant Khismatulin had to evaluate the importance of the targets and order of firing against them. He reported his decision to the platoon leader by radio and gave the target indication. Khismatulin considered the tank in the trench the most dangerous target and ordered the gunner to hit it first, although this target was at a great range for direct fire and did not represent the menace that the antitank gun did.

Warrant Officer Davydkov called a partial retreat upon hearing the tank commander's plan. He made a brief review of the crew's actions and pointed out mistakes. The gunner, for example, did nothing but follow the commands of the tank commander; he himself did not evaluate the importance of the targets, even though this is his direct obligation. The mechanic-driver drove straight, paying no attention to the nature of the terrain or camouflaging.

After ascertaining that the crew had studied and evaluated the situation, the platoon leader gave the command to continue action. The dug-in tank was wiped out with concentrated platoon fire.

Then Warrant Officer Davydkov moved on to the next question: crossing obstacles. He showed the crew the route. The tank moved to a very rugged locale with deep craters, ditches, and other antitank obstacles. The crew strengthened its surveillance of the terrain and the enemy. Following commands by Junior Sergeant Khismatulin, mechanic-driver Pvt B. Dorodonov crossed the obstacles that he met on the route.

While crossing the obstacle sector the gunner spotted an antitank gun and infantry group in the second trench. After reporting its plan to the platoon leader the crew wiped them out with cannon and machine gun fire. The training leader halted the tank again for a review. He pointed out that the enemy infantry should be cleaned up by machine gun fire only; cannons should not be used in order to avoid unjustified expenditures of ammunition.

After seeing that the crew understood its mistake the warrant officer gave the command "Mount!" and presented the objective for further actions by radio. During the movement he reported to the trainees that the enemy, concealing himself by a smoke screen, was retreating, and on the terrain pointed out "burning" tanks and retreating armored personnel carriers.

Junior Sergeant Khismatulin evaluated the situation and decided to pursue the enemy. The platoon leader confirmed that and ordered him to attack the retreating enemy near Bezymyannaya hill. During performance of this mission the crew cooperated with other tanks to destroy various targets, in some cases operating from the side.

To begin work on the training question of crossing a sector of contaminated terrain the training leader issued the command "Gas!" by radio and announced an attack by enemy aviation. Warrant Officer Davydkov watched to see that all crew members put on protective gear without slackening surveillance or stopping the vehicle. After leaving the contaminated zone the tank was stopped, the platoon leader checked whether the protective gear and gas masks had been put on correctly, and ordered them to begin a partial decontamination of the vehicle and weapons. The tank troops surpassed time standards in performing all of this work.

The crew had to repulse the counterattack by enemy infantry reinforcement tanks in place, cooperating with neighbors. During the counterattack the tank was hit and "caught fire." Thus, the crew had to solve several problems immediately: the gunner and loader wiped out the enemy and extinguished the fire while the mechanic-driver cared for the "wounded" tank commander.

Other inputs can be envisioned too for restoring fighting effectiveness, for example the tank's hitting a mine during pursuit (and this

can be under enemy fire or not). The training leader himself solved this problem, but in subsequent drills crews must go through all possible variations.

Warrant Officer Davydkov ended the training period with a review and evaluation of the actions of the crew as a whole and of each individual. He singled out the best soldiers and criticized the mistakes of certain men and pointed out how to correct them.

In addition, as already observed, the platoon leader stopped the training period several times, reviewed mistakes, and drilled trainees in correct methods. These interruptions are inevitable, especially in the early phases of developing teamwork. After all, the crew is constantly receiving replacements. Later, when the men are improving skills already acquired, interruptions are allowed only for blatantly incorrect actions.

Many will undoubtedly wonder what the other crews of the platoon are doing at this time. After all, the company schedule envisions this topic for the entire platoon, not for one particular crew. There are many different answers to this question. In our example the platoon leader conducts the training period with each crew in turn. But it is also possible for the entire platoon to go to the training field and the commander will work through the training questions with each crew in parallel.

Another possible technique is to have one crew work during movement in one direction, and then another while returning to the starting position. At this time the third crew supports them or stays with the platoon commander in a vehicle and solves tactical problems which are later worked through in practice.

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Night Firing Training Described

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 22 May 78 pp 8-9

[Article by Sgt V. Knyazev, commander of an outstanding tank, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Night Tank Fire"]

The men of our subunit are carefully studying the statements by the top gunners who responded to Sgt V. Nesterov's article entitled "Hit the Target on the First Shot" in ZNAMENOSETS (No 3, 1978). Indeed, the question of fire effectiveness in battle is one of the most important parts of combat training and success in this matter depends greatly on us, the commanders of squads, teams, and crews.

In my turn, I also would like to share some know-how in tank firing at night, to tell about the useful things we have learned in our subunit.

It is common knowledge that night creates additional difficulties for tank forces: the field of vision of the sight is limited; it is difficult to scout targets because of the uniform color range of the terrain and available objects; foreign sources of light, especially centers of fire, blind the firer, and so on. All these things require great combat skill and working harmony of the crew and outstanding individual training from each crew member. They must have flawless skills in handling night vision instruments and weapons.

For example, take target reconnaissance. Two panoramas of the same sector of the enemy forward edge of defense are shown below [not reproduced] in general form. The upper picture shows what a gunner sees in a daylight sight; the bottom one shows the night picture. In the first case the lines of the targets, orientation markers, and terrain objects are distinct; in the other case the outlines are blurred and elements of the objects of observation are diffused. The central night sight mark is aimed at the middle of an apparent square which could easily be taken as the tank target. In fact it is a thick bush. And look at the wooden bridge across the river. In the daylight sight we can even see details of its railing, but in the night sight they are blurred. The two white rocks by the lone tree could be taken for an antitank rocket target at night. And on the other hand, the antitank rocket, which is to the right of the tank in trench 0-14, looks like a bush or terrain object.

Nonetheless, it is not particularly difficult for a skillful tank soldier to identify the targets, determine distances to them precisely, and then hit them accurately. He distinguishes a target by its characteristic illumination that is different from the illumination of terrain objects, and he determines the type of target by its outlines and individual elements. In our example, the tank in the trench almost merges with the surroundings in the field of vision of the night sight. It can be taken as part of the bush protruding to the right of the lone tree. However, the experienced eye of the gunner will definitely notice the revealing features of a target, which allow him to draw a correct conclusion about it. For one, even though it is dim, the outline of the tank turret can be guessed against the bush background. It is possible to dimly make out the top, oblique side lines, the muzzle of the cannon in the middle, and the sockets for the head of the sight and machine gun barrel to its right and left. For two, the luminescence of the visible part of the tank will be brighter than that of the bush, which also distinguishes the target from the surrounding terrain.

From personal experience and the experience of my fellow soldiers, I can say that it is much easier to observe through a night sight if you spend a few minutes (5-6) before the exercise looking in it, which is to give your eyes a chance to be accustomed (adapted) to night conditions. Even high school textbooks tell us that when a person is moved from a lighted room into a dark place his eyes will acquire the

ability to distinguish objects only after a certain time has passed. This physiological factor cannot be disregarded. That is why the next replacement crew in our subunit during night firing is at a less illuminated training position, and those who are going to perform the exercise spend several minutes looking in night sights. Then these tank soldiers do not experience difficulties scouting targets during the fire exercise. I once observed the following in one of the subunits. Three crews were drilling in a well-lighted classroom. The command was given, and after receiving ammunition, they moved to the combat vehicles. They did not even fire at the first and second targets because they did not see them. But when they came to the third group of targets all of them without exception fired well. The reason is perfectly simple. By the time they fired at the last targets the eyes of the tank gunners had adapted and they were able to detect and hit the targets.

When the tank cannon fires there is a flash that blinds the crew members, especially untrained members. It takes several seconds to restore normal vision. This means that the crew loses combat aggressiveness for several seconds.

The soldiers of our subunit have developed and introduced a valuable efficiency proposal. A lighting device is secured to a special bracket on a special trainer designed for drilling the crew with the night sight. When the button of the electrical switch is pressed a powerful flash just like that of a real shot is formed in front of the sight. After 5-8 such flashes the trainee's eyes become accustomed and light blindness does not frighten the crew. We always take this trainer with us for night firing.

Nothing is trivial when preparing a crew for night firing. Everything is important and must be done in a thoughtful way without any mistakes. After all, any oversight might nullify the efforts of the entire crew. The following once happened in our subunit. Gunner Pvt S. Romanovskiy, generally an outstandingly trained specialist, was in too much of a hurry and forgot to adjust the eyepiece of the sight for sharpness. As a result he failed to see the first and second targets and did not fire at them, figuring that the infrared light was poorly adjusted. Only at the end of the exercise did he figure out his mistake; he quickly set the sight for sharpness and hit the third target. In battle such carelessness would be too expensive for the crew. Private Romanovskiy drew the correct conclusions from this case, and he was not the only one.

It is difficult to orient oneself on the terrain at night, so determining distances to targets is quite complex. I teach my subordinates to begin target reconnaissance with a quick scan of the assigned fire sector. The trainees see several objects. They must distinguish the enemy targets corresponding to the conditions of the exercise among them. Distance is determined by degree of visibility.

The closer the target is the more distinctly it is seen, the more detail can be made out.

The high visibility of the trajectory of shells and machine gun rounds is an undisputed advantage of night firing. This makes it much easier for the gunner to correct his fire at night. From experience I would say that it is best to correct for line using figures of the target, but to change the sight (set a new aiming mark) to correct for distance.

The diagrams [not reproduced] show that a deviation to the left of one figure of the target occurred on the first shot (the aiming mark is the top of the upper vertical hatchure and the aiming point is the center of the target). We move the aiming point to the right one figure of the target and the fire problem is solved.

We correct for distance by marking the explosion or trajectory. In my opinion it is best to fire the first shot (round) short, because then it is easier to determine the magnitude of error. If the target is slightly overshoot it is possible to hit it with the second shell (round) without changing the sight setting (firing is done on the move).

The high point of fire training for crews of our company was the tactical exercise with night field fire. Before going into the field we prepared the weapons and equipment carefully, giving special attention to ranging the cannon and machine gun and checking the sights and night vision instruments. For after all, weapons and instruments that are not prepared for battle lead to low marks and undermine the gunners' confidence in the correctness of their actions. Suppose that a gunner who knows the rules of fire well does everything correctly: determines the range and aiming mark exactly, aims, and fires. But the shell misses the target because the weapon was not properly prepared.

Here is how the men of our subunit operate at a tactical exercise. The crew was attacking the forward edge of the enemy defense at high speed. Actually, the attack at night was hardly different from a daytime attack in character; maneuvering, dynamic qualities, and effective use of combat equipment. The crews had a fine view of the terrain and targets in their night vision instruments. At first our platoon was commanded to wage concentrated fire against a tank in a trench at maximum range and we destroyed it with the first three shots, which sounded like a single volley. Then the subunit's fire was distributed among newly appeared targets. The crew wiped out an antitank rocket, three infantry groups, and a vehicle-mounted recoilless weapon accurately, on their first shots and machine gun round, then waged fire against counterattacking enemy tanks from a favorable line. Not a single target went unhit. The subunit was given an outstanding mark. This was the result of the tank soldiers' persistent drilling and their ability to know and carry out the rules of night fire thoroughly and exactly.

In conclusion I would like to say that our crew has had some success in the struggle for high marks in combat and political training. We fulfilled our socialist obligations completely and received nothing but outstanding evaluations for all fire exercises. By order of the commander we won the challenge Pennant imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Lt V. Knyazev. The name of this courageous tank soldier emblazons the armor of our tank.

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Platoon Commander Initiative Encouraged

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 22 May 78
pp 10-11

[Article by Maj Gen Tank Trps A. Zyryanov: "The Regulations and the Commander's Creativity in Battle"]

[Text] Modern battle makes great demands of all commanders. They must have a high level of ideological-political and psychological conditioning, solve combat problems quickly and intelligently, control subunits confidently, teach and indoctrinate subordinates, and command them skillfully in the performance of combat missions.

But each commander must take a creative approach to performance of his regulation duties, giving full consideration to the situation. This is no accident. Certainly, it is impossible for the regulations to take account of the variety of situations in which subunits may find themselves. Therefore, the regulations cannot give exhaustive recommendations for the actions of commanders in different conditions. The regulations stipulate the basic principles of preparation, organization, and conduct of combat actions. They also say that the instructions contained in them must be applied as befits the situation.

Choice of the axis of the attack, the battle formation, the use of fire, cooperation with other subunits, and success in battle depend largely on evaluation of the situation on the terrain. By careful study of the terrain the commander will be able to determine the extent to which it facilitates a successful attack by the subunit and what advantages it gives to the enemy. Thus, a skillful and creative approach must also be taken to evaluating the terrain and using its advantageous conditions.

Some sergeants do not always study the terrain carefully; they even believe that evaluating it is the job of officers only. However, terrain conditions affect the actions of the squad and tank, and therefore each sergeant must be able to evaluate them independently and with tactical intelligence. This will help figure out the situation correctly and, for example, determine which slope of a hill is most advantageous or where to select a convenient fire position, a concealed route for maneuvering, or the best axis of attack. It is

also important to emphasize that the commander of the company or platoon cannot foresee everything, and when the attack begins, with bad weather too, concealing many terrain objects, it is extremely hard to orient oneself and indicate the route exactly for each tank and squad. Therefore, the commander of a tank or squad himself should be able to choose the most advantageous route of attack under such conditions.

The most important phase of an offensive is the attack on the enemy's forward edge of defense and fighting in the near depth. A great deal here depends on reliable neutralization of means of fire, both before the attack and during it.

A tactical exercise was underway. The tank subunit was demonstrating a high level of field skills. WO V. Lapin commanded one of the leading platoons. After strong fire preparation conducted according to the senior officer's plan it appeared that the enemy defense was reliably suppressed. But when the tanks went on the attack they met strong fire from the south slopes of Dvugorbaya Hill (see Diagram 1 below). Warrant Officer Lapin's platoon was the first to detect the important targets and wipe them out with concentrated fire. Continuing the attack, his subordinates hit several more targets located on the forward edge of defense, including a recoilless gun, a machine gun, and an antitank grenade launcher.

A minefield lay ahead. Passage No 2 was provided for the platoon. It was crossed under cover of artillery fire and with the mutual fire support of tanks of the platoon. In this complex situation Warrant Officer Lapin determined the order of passage precisely. The second tank went first and then moved slightly to the right. The first and third vehicles came after it. After crossing the passage they took their places in the platoon battle formation: the first crew in the center and the third on the left flank. Each tank, after completing the passage, traveled at high speed waging intensive cannon and machine gun fire. The other two vehicles, slowing down somewhat, also carried on fire against enemy manpower and weapons located on the forward edge of defense and in the near depths. This formation made it possible to cross the passage quickly, without deploying in a platoon column or using special maneuvers. But it sometimes happens that tanks that have moved as close as possible to a minefield in platoon battle formation turn to the right or left to reach the passage, thus exposing their sides to the enemy. In actual battle, of course, such actions may result in losses.

After crossing the minefield the tanks reached their axes of attack and raced swiftly down on the forward edge of the enemy defense. The defenders' fire intensified noticeably. In addition, a self-propelled gun was moved to the southern edge of Gribnaya Grove (see Diagram 1) and an antitank cannon was placed in the area of the two mounds. The platoon commander had to decide quickly to forestall the enemy by opening fire and destroying the targets that represented the greatest danger. Warrant Officer Lapin did not lose his




Diagram 1




Diagram 2

- | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Key: (a) Gribnaya Grove; | (e) Polyogaya Hill; |
| (b) Barn; | (f) Skortsovo; |
| (c) Dvugorbaya Hill; | (g) One Tank Platoon. |
| (d) Redkaya Grove; | |

composure in this complex situation, but issued the command precisely: "23rd, 24th (the call numbers of the second and third tanks), this is 22nd. Attack toward the barn and the embankment. Twenty-third: hit the self-propelled gun at the edge of Gribnaya Grove. Twenty-fourth — the gun by the two mounds. This is 22nd. Over."

He directed the fire of his tank against the self-propelled gun also. Soon the dangerous targets were destroyed and the platoon continued its successful advance to the depth of the enemy defense.

The commander must also control subunits skillfully when fighting in the depth of the defense. When overcoming enemy resistance one should always look for weak spots in his system of defense; they may occur when there is not a solid line of defense with close fire coordination among the separate centers of resistance. The boundaries and flanks of strongpoints are often weakly defended; sometimes they are completely bare. They must be used to penetrate boldly to the depth of the defense. When fighting for control of individual strongpoints the combat mission must be performed by other methods. In one case the best method will be a frontal attack by the entire subunit, while in another it may be to encircle the enemy and strike unexpectedly from the flank and rear, and in a third case a combination of frontal attack and envelopment from the flank and rear may be optimal.

Thus, maneuvers should be used more extensively when fighting in the depth of the defense, without fear of being cut off from other subunits and losing fire cooperation and visual contact with them. Readiness to maneuver is a reliable guarantee of success in battle. Many examples confirm this. Here is one.

During the battle the situation took shape in such a way that it was most advantageous to capture the populated point of Skortsovo by envelopment by the entire company. The subunit commander gave his platoons the appropriate missions.

The enemy, threatened by a tank assault, tried to strengthen his right flank, but it was too late. Supported by artillery fire the company made a swift attack and took this important point. As can be seen from the example, the company fulfilled its combat mission thanks to the readiness of each crew to maneuver.

The commander has considerable opportunity for creativity when adopting the plan to repulse a counterattack. After taking the populated point of Skortsovo, the first tank platoon in the column continued moving toward Pologaya Hill. At this time the platoon leader received a report that up to a company of tanks with armored personnel carriers had moved out from Redkaya Grove (see Diagram 2). It became clear that the enemy was preparing to counterattack. The attack would have to be repulsed on the spot, from the slopes of Pologaya Hill. But the platoon leader adopted a different, bold and daring plan: taking advantage of folds in the terrain, reach the separate barns and, from there, strike the enemy unexpectedly in the flank and wipe him out. He reported his actions to the company commander and, after receiving authorization, issued the appropriate commands. The tank crews deployed in battle formation and swiftly attacked the enemy, who was preparing to deploy in battle formation. The maneuver was successful and the enemy retreated.

It can be seen from these examples how our leading commanders of squads, tanks, and platoons, guided by regulation principles, thoroughly analyze the concrete situation and successfully carry out combat missions.

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TRAINING OF SUBMARINE TORPEDO CREW DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 22 May 78 p 7

[Article by Warrant Officer V. Tsvirinskiy: "Effectiveness of Training Minutes"]

[Text] Communist submariner Warrant Officer V. Tsvirinskiy possesses a master proficiency rating and is one of the top specialists in the naval combined unit. The crew he leads has for several years running earned the title of excellent. The subunit personnel actively participate in socialist competition. The men are assisted in achieving new success in military labor by the excellent methods skill of their leader, Warrant Officer Tsvirinskiy, and his ability efficiently to utilize each and every minute of training time. In this article he relates how he achieves this.

A routine practical drill was being conducted in the torpedo room on the following topic: "Torpedo tube testing and adjustment." The men were in a businesslike mood. Together with the men we examined in detail the procedure of inspecting and readying the torpedo tubes for firing, the specific features of the operating procedures and their sequence. The men listened to me attentively. But then I sensed that their attention had begun to wander. "It is time to give them a verbal test," I thought to myself. But before proceeding with it, I reminded the men how important it is not to disrupt the sequence of verification checks, promptly and precisely to report on performance of key operations, and I read them the appropriate points in the manual.

PO 2d Class A. Shirayev volunteered to answer the first question -- list the procedures of readying a torpedo tube for firing. His reply was flawless. But I wanted to make sure that the torpedo crew not only had thoroughly memorized the sequence of readying operations but also thoroughly comprehended the substance of these operations. Therefore I asked PO 1st Class V. Mel'nikov to relate the processes taking place as a result of each manipulation and actually to ready a tube for firing. Usually Mel'nikov does a good job with answers and demonstration. This time also he replied with confidence. I would have been entirely satisfied if I had not suddenly looked over toward

Sr Sn V. Kimasov. The latter was not paying particular attention to his comrade.

I immediately told Kimasov to continue the procedures report, complete preparations and fire. What was left for him to do was to open the tube door, report ready, and on command push the firing lever -- compressed air would enter the tube and "fire" the torpedo. During a practical drill all these processes are realistically simulated. Kimasov, however, due to his lack of attention, forgot one detail in Mel'nikov's presentation. It was necessary to activate in the system a component, which we call "prostavka," which would fully simulate opening the tube door. The young torpedoman failed to do so, but reported ready to fire. He was genuinely surprised when after the command "Fire!", jerking the valve, he failed to hear the familiar hissing and air discharge -- the torpedo did not fire.

After this there was no need to convince Kimasov that it is necessary to pay attention when a comrade is delivering a report. Mel'nikov's explanation of why air did not enter the system (it was blocked, since door opening was not simulated), the torpedoman listened attentively. After that he did not make mistakes of this kind....

Recalling this incident at training drills, I think about the fact that if I had failed to notice Kimasov that day, a gap would have developed in his knowledge, elimination of which would have required a great many minutes and perhaps hours of such short-supply training time. Yes, knowledge and consideration of such features in organization and conduct of classes and training drills perhaps contain reserve potential for increasing their effectiveness. Also of considerable significance is the personal innovativeness of the commander -- elaboration and perfecting of favorite techniques and methods of influencing his men, a constant search for the new and interesting, everything which can diversify and enliven training. For example, I have done a great deal of work on selecting vivid facts from experience of operating torpedo equipment, practical firing exercises, servicing and maintenance of equipment under conditions of an extended ocean cruise. I am constantly continuing even today accumulation of such episodes from the practical experience of the present day and the Great Patriotic War, and when necessary I can illustrate a lecture on any topic with an appropriate example.

At the drill we were discussing at the beginning of the article, for example, in covering torpedo tube check procedures I mentioned several instances which had occurred on board submarines during wartime. On one occasion in readying a tube for firing a torpedo specialist had failed to check the presence of a "prostavka" in the bubble-free torpedo firing system. During firing the valve releasing the compressed air did not open. An air bubble was ejected from the tube behind the torpedo and rose to the surface. The submarine gave away its presence.

The example I related, as I subsequently learned, was well remembered by the crewmen. I could be confident that none of them would forget this check procedure. This is precisely what I was seeking to achieve by including in my presentation a true fact from actual naval activities. Reference to a specific incident, naming the ship, place and time, persons involved and a detailed description of the incident always impresses and convinces. For this was not simply "could happen," but is something which has already happened for a well-known reason, and it is necessary to keep this firmly in mind in order not to be trapped. Such psychological preparation increases a trainee's receptivity, which directly helps increase the effectiveness of training minutes.

The most important thing toward which I strive at every practical training session is to convince the men that precise observance of the demands of regulations and the manual, proper care of the equipment and prompt preventive maintenance make it possible to eliminate breakdown of instruments and mechanisms. I show with actual examples and personal actions that thorough knowledge of combat equipment and weapons ensure successful accomplishment of assigned tasks.

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AIR BASE GROUND CREW OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press 22 May 78 p 19

[Article by WO P. Netrobin, airfield-technical platoon commander: "We Repair With Our Own Resources"]

[Text] Prompt preparation of an airfield for flight operations depends in large measure on the proper operating condition of special ground vehicles. A thrifty, proprietary attitude toward equipment makes it possible not only successfully to accomplish the tasks assigned the men of the airfield-technical platoon but also to economize in supplies and equipment. We have seen through our experience that by observing proper maintenance procedures one can be confident of vehicle reliability. Caring for equipment, operating and maintaining it properly, and in this way extending its service life -- herein is manifested the true skill of aviators, for the main thing is to prevent breakdowns which lead to equipment down time, to expenditure of spare parts, and to inefficient utilization of equipment and supplies.

Such men as L. Mostanskiy, M. Rustamov, and A. Khamrakulov can serve for platoon personnel as an example of skilled performance on combination watering and washing vehicles (KPM) and snowplows. For example, when cleaning and sweeping the runway and taxiways, drivers operate the vehicles in such a manner as to avoid lugging the motor. They operate cautiously: foreign objects entering the screw conveyers or rotor can cause damage. Maintenance specialists carefully monitor the condition of the KPM brushes and perform skilled seasonal maintenance and servicing operations on the equipment.

Vehicle malfunctions occur in the course of airfield activities. Experience has shown that the weakest link on the KPM is the working equipment reduction gear and transfer case. In order to avoid down time due to failure of various assemblies, we in the platoon decided to establish a current maintenance stock. It includes a reduction gear, transfer case and other assemblies. Let us assume that a breakdown has occurred. The malfunctioning assembly will be immediately removed and replaced with a new one. This will require only minutes to accomplish.

Equipment from two retired watering and washing vehicles was utilized. Mostanskiy, Khamrakulov and I disassembled reduction gears, transfer cases, cleaned old grease from ball bearings and pinions, determined their degree of wear, replaced worn components and as a result assembled two serviceable reduction gears and one transfer case. Last winter our replacement stock saved the day for us, during the most highly intensive work operations. Equipment down time was reduced to a minimum, which promotes economy and thrift.

There exists a certain pattern: men who operate and maintain vehicles intelligently, who perform their duties with initiative and zeal, as a rule are also well trained technically. They know the units and assemblies of their vehicles, maintain their equipment in good condition, and perform minor repairs and routine maintenance quickly. They can also handle more difficult jobs. We have such noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel in our subunit.

Last summer we had to send two screw-rotary snowplows and three combination watering-washing vehicles to the factory for a major overhaul.

"Can't we do some of the work with our own resources?"

We assessed our capabilities and decided that we could keep one snowplow and one KPM and overhaul them ourselves. In the first place this would produce savings of several thousand rubles, and in the second place it would reduce overhaul time.

While overhaul operations were in progress, the men had to master different occupational specialties. Sense of responsibility also played a role in mobilization of our internal resources. The men accepted upgraded pledges, gave their word, and this meant that it had to be kept.

"The person who wants to do something looks for the means of doing it, while he who does not want to do something looks for reasons." Officer N. Saburov always presents things to the aviators in this manner.

And this is no empty phrase. Let us say that a crack has appeared in the metal snowplow frame, to which the rotor and screw conveyers are attached. In order to weld it, I had to do the job of an arc welder. The main point here is not whether a professional weld was obtained but that the frame was repaired in a prompt manner.

It was necessary to fabricate new nylon and metal brushes for the watering and washing vehicle and to replace the deformed brush rotating shaft. L. Mostanskiy and A. Khamrakulov set up and adjusted the brush winding machine, repaired auxiliary equipment, learned to perform all operations, and as a result produced the needed brushes.

Thrift and economy in my opinion are inseparably linked with technical quest and initiative. For example, metal tubes in the hydraulic system of the

KPM plow blade lift mechanism were broken. There were no replacement parts at the airfield. It was not possible to fabricate new ones which could stand up under pressure of tens of atmospheres. Therefore we took high-pressure rubber-metal hoses, put a suitable fitting on the ends, and the hydraulic lift mechanism was back in working order.

The snowplow and watering-washing vehicle are based on the ZIL-157 and ZIL-130 truck. The automotive shop was very helpful to us in effecting truck motor and running gear repairs. In the automotive shop we obtained everything we needed to overhaul axles and engines.

We cannot discuss in detail all examples of technical ingenuity and cleverness. The main thing was that the men worked selflessly, many times late into the evening. A desire to accomplish the task on schedule, to see the results of their labor, and to feel the joy of discovery unified this unique little team of Leonid Mostanskiy, Musazhon Rustamov and Arap Khamrakulov. Each member worked, as they say, not from fear but conscience.

We can come right out and state today that without army mutual assistance, the platoon's success would be more modest. We are speaking not only of the mutual assistance among the subunits of our unit and garrison. For example, in one of the engines it was necessary to replace the iron-asbestos cylinder block gaskets. Our unit's automotive shop contacted the motor pool at the neighboring garrison and obtained them on a mutual exchange basis.

The first month of summer has become for us the first month of preparing equipment for next winter. In response to the letter from the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, All-Union Central Trade Union Council and Komsomol Central Committee to party, Soviet, economic, trade union and Komsomol organizations as well as all toilers of the Soviet Union on socialist competition for 1978 plan fulfillment and overfulfillment and a stepped-up campaign to improve production efficiency and work quality this year, we resolved to perform with the manpower and resources of our platoon medium repairs on two combination watering and washing vehicles and two screw-rotary snowplows. The men have already amassed certain experience, and there is every reason to assume that our pledges will be successfully met.

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COMMENTS ON NIGHT SIGHTING CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 78 pp 22-23

[Article by Engr-Col Ye. Simakov: "By Night As By Day"*]

[Text] It has long been known that heated bodies are sources of invisible infrared (IR) radiation. It is frequently called heat radiation as well. In actual fact every body emits infrared rays. On the ground, for example, factories, cars, tanks and even man are sources of IR rays. The higher the temperature of the body from which they are emitted, the greater the intensity of IR radiation.

Just as visible radiation, infrared rays propagate rectilinearly and obey the optical laws of reflection and refraction. They also have their own peculiarities, however, the most important of which is the capability to pass through opaque materials. Black photographic paper, a thin sheet of ebonite, and cardboard do not impede IR rays. Man cannot see them.

Special devices exist for viewing objects emitting infrared (heat) rays. They are called infrared viewing devices. They operate on the principle of recording the temperature contrast between the object and the background.

Infrared viewing devices have been extensively utilized, including in the military. With their aid one can detect, for example, hostile aircraft and ships which are invisible to the eye. An aircraft in flight ejects into the air hot gases the temperature of which reaches several hundred degrees. These gases become a powerful source of infrared radiation. In addition, when flying at supersonic speeds, the temperature of an aircraft's skin rises due to air friction, and therefore the fuselage, wings and tail also begin to emit infrared energy. The same applies to a moving ship.

Modern infrared viewing devices also provide the capability to determine the location of motor vehicles with running engines, artillery pieces with barrels which have not yet cooled after firing, as well as other objects. This is particularly characteristic of hours of darkness, when heated objects stand

* Based on materials published abroad

out even more against the background. During daylight hours infrared viewing devices can help spot well camouflaged rifleman foxholes, trucks, tanks, submarines, etc. Even under poor weather conditions (clouds, precipitation, fog and haze) which reduce operating effectiveness, the effective range of infrared equipment is 3 to 6 times that of visual surveillance devices.

Concealment is an important virtue of infrared viewing equipment. Since it operates passively (without external illumination), the enemy cannot detect these devices.

A reconnaissance aircraft is flying in total darkness (Figure 1). It carries on board, in addition to aerial cameras and radar gear, an infrared system which can take a thermal map of the terrain below. On this map one can clearly distinguish roads and streets, runways, missile launch sites, and ships both docked and at sea.

The principal element of these IR systems is the detecting-scanning device. A prismatic mirror scans the image line by line. Rotating, it continuously views a specific segment of the terrain below in a direction perpendicular to the line of flight. The device works as follows. IR rays emitted from the object are brought to the radiation detector with the aid of mirrors and lenses. The detector converts infrared energy into electrical signals which, acting on photodiodes, vary the intensity of their luminosity. A visible image of the target object is obtained on photographic film.

There is also forward-looking IR surveillance gear. Reconnaissance aircraft, ground-attack aircraft, bombers, pilotless drones and helicopters are equipped with such gear. The possibility is being studied of employing such equipment in the homing warheads of air-to-ground missiles, in air defense and ship missile-artillery systems, as well as in other weapons. This gear contains a two-plane scanning system and can operate in surveillance and detailed reconnaissance mode. An image of the target terrain appears on a cathode-ray tube on board the aircraft.

Multiple-element IR radiation detectors are employed to obtain images in these devices. A visible image is formed on a matrix consisting of photodiodes. It is transmitted to a screen with the aid of a TV camera. In order to obtain a highly-precise image of the terrain, more sensitive elements, which are smaller in size, are placed in the central part of the detector.

Forward-looking airborne infrared equipment usually operates in concert with other airborne equipment. For example, on the U.S. S-3A ASW aircraft a forward-looking surveillance unit is computer-coupled into a common system with radar, ASW gear and weapons.

In recent years so-called laser bombs have become quite widespread abroad. These are conventional bombs carrying a laser guidance system. When these bombs are employed in combat it is necessary for the target to be illuminated by a laser beam. Laser-beaming equipment is usually carried on board a special aircraft (Figure 2), but it can also be carried by the aircraft doing the bombing. In the latter case the laser-beaming system works in conjunction with other systems.

On the A-6E embarked attack aircraft, the forward-looking surveillance telescope is mounted together with laser equipment on a stabilized platform contained in the lower part of the aircraft's nose fairing. When performing a combat mission, the crew flies into the target area with the aid of radar. Target coordinates are automatically fed to a computer, which formulates commands for appropriate orientation of the IR system lens and laser emitter. When an image of the ground appears on the screen and the operator recognizes the target, he switches on the target laser-beaming emitter and, when reaching the required range, releases a homing laser bomb.

On board the B-52 strategic bomber the infrared forward-looking IR surveillance gear is coupled into a common system with the navigation-bombing system, course sensor and radar altimeter. Thanks to this it has become possible to obtain as a scope display both a combined ground image produced by radar and infrared, TV and infrared [sic] systems, and a separate image obtained from any one of them. In addition, the CRT displays contain digital information on altitude, speed, course and other requisite data.

Combined infrared and TV systems are placed in controlled nose turrets and provide the aircrew with a view of the terrain below between an angle of 45 degrees to the right and left of the aircraft's heading. Their utilization enables aircraft, without giving themselves away, to approach SAM sites at low altitude and destroy them, as well as to taxi, take off and land in poor weather and at night.

Plans call for equipping the new B-1 supersonic strategic bomber with combined image converter gear, including an infrared system.

Foreign experts plan to increase the effectiveness of helicopter gunships, particularly during night actions, with utilization of infrared equipment. Helicopters will be equipped with specially developed gear, including independent pilot and gunner subsystems. The pilot subsystem will provide a broad view (up to 120°) of the ground with CRT or windshield display. The gunner subsystem will have greater resolving power, which will make it possible to identify targets. This subsystem will be linked to an optical sight, a laser range finder-target designator and a laser-indicated target tracking sensor. It is also planned to employ forward-looking infrared gear in homing heads. It is believed that their adoption will make it possible to employ glide bombs and air-to-ground missiles under zero-visibility conditions.

The possibility of employing forward-looking infrared gear in ground forces is also being studied. They will be in the form of night vision devices and sights and will be mounted on tanks and armored personnel carriers. An IR device has already been designed for ground troops, which weighs 5 kg together with its power supply. With this device one can see topography, personnel and equipment camouflaged by foliage, as well as objects on the water surface at night, during light fog and smoke. Similar devices can be utilized for detecting buried landmines.

In their aggressive plans the imperialists attach great importance to equipping their troops with the latest weapons and equipment. Work is also in progress on further improvement of infrared gear.

All this imposes heightened demands on knowledge by Soviet military personnel of the adversary's weapons and equipment and skilled employment of the advantages of their own weapons to achieve victory.

CAPTIONS TO FIGURES

Figure 1. Diagram of Infrared Gear for Thermal-Mapping Terrain.

Figure 2. Diagram of Laser Glide-Bomb Guidance.

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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Pacific Fleet Commander on Training Results

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 78 signed to press 22 Jun 78 pp 1-2

[Article by Adm V. P. Maslov, Commander, Red-Banner Pacific Fleet: "Ocean Conditioning"]

[Text] The men of the Pacific Fleet are presently celebrating a traditional holiday -- Navy Day, in an atmosphere of great patriotic enthusiasm evoked by a visit to the fleet by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This constituted a moving and unforgettable event. Leonid Il'ich became acquainted with the daily life and combat training of fleet personnel and delivered an interesting address on board the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin." Get-togethers between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and workers at industrial enterprises, young construction workers on the Baykal-Amur Mainline, army and navy personnel on his trip to Siberia and the Far East became a vivid demonstration of unity between party and people.

The visit to our fleet by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and his high praise for the military labor of personnel became additional evidence of the constant solicitude on the part of the Communist Party and Soviet Government for strengthening defense might and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR. At political rallies military personnel and fleet civilian workers and employees unanimously expressed their feelings of deep gratitude to Leonid Il'ich for his tireless labor for the benefit of the people and for his great attention to the army and navy.

During their visit to the fleet, comrades L. I. Brezhnev and USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, went to sea on board the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin" and observed a bilateral exercise. This exercise during the visit to the fleet by the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet became a critical examination for the men of the Pacific Fleet. And they passed the test with honor. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that the men of the fleet displayed excellent proficiency, skillfully engaging submarines, surface ships and aircraft. He also emphasized the high level of organization of control of fleet personnel and

equipment. In commemoration of his visit on the cruiser, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev presented the ship's company with a photographic portrait and made an entry in the ship's album for honored visitors.

We were fully justified in reporting to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov that fleet personnel are working hard on carrying out the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress on strengthening the nation's defense capability in the Far East. Commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations are performing diversified work on instilling in personnel Communist conviction, excellent moral-political and fighting qualities, a class hatred toward the enemies of socialism, and exposure of bourgeois and Maoist ideology. All their thoughts are focused on maintaining units and ships in a high state of combat readiness. On long ocean cruises the men of the Pacific Fleet, just as all naval personnel, display a high degree of conscientiousness, ideological maturity, courage, and outstanding naval proficiency.

Today long cruises are a normal occurrence in navy life. This has become possible due to the excellent shipboard equipment and tireless military labor on the part of naval personnel, which is so greatly appreciated by party and government. Recently I had the pleasant duty of awarding, on behalf of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, decorations and medals to a large group of Pacific Fleet personnel. A high decoration was awarded, for example, to Sr Lt V. Gorchakov, party committee secretary on the guided missile cruiser "Admiral Fokin." This ship has logged thousands of ocean miles. The cruiser's crew has left behind a pleasant memory with the people of many foreign ports where it has paid a call as an official representative of the USSR. Everywhere the men have evoked delight with their excellent manners and culture.

Of course the paying of friendly visits is only a small part of that vast range of tasks performed on a cruise by the cruiser "Admiral Fokin." On long cruises the ship's crew members improve their combat proficiency, perform missile firings, practice gunnery, learn to destroy hostile submarines and perform many other combat training tasks. And at all times the men display a high level of discipline and responsibility for performing their constitutional duty to defend the homeland, for which much credit goes to Communists and the party committee, which is headed by Sr Lt V. Gorchakov. The cruiser "Admiral Fokin" is the finest ship in the Red-Banner Pacific Fleet.

Those receiving government decorations included WO V. Bulochnikov and CPO A. Zyuzin. Both serve on an excellent-rated submarine, head excellent crews, and are skilled indoctrinators of their subordinates. Recently the submarine completed a long ocean cruise. It was not easy, taking place in a situation maximally approaching actual combat. However, the submariners successfully accomplished all combat-training tasks. Socialist competition winners included the men under WO V. Bulochnikov and CPO A. Zyuzin.

Excellent moral-political qualities and preparedness to perform exploits are of course important not only for those cruising distant waters. These

important qualities are needed by the man of any navy occupational specialty. For example, at first glance WO Ya. Gerus has a very modest job: he is in charge of a training center where future aviation specialists receive the requisite training for working on equipment. If we look more deeply and broadly, however, at Warrant Officer Gerus's job, we see its unquestioned significance. It is true that this warrant officer does not personally take to the skies and does not personally preflight aircraft, but his pupils do all this. It is precisely in the training center headed by Warrant Officer Gerus that young aviation specialists receive the foundation of their future skills and excellent moral-fighting qualities. Therefore without the labor of such experienced methods specialists and indoctrinators as Warrant Officer Gerus, aircraft could not take to the skies. And I was pleased to award him this deserved government decoration.

WO Aleksandr Zharkov was not able to receive his decoration. At the beginning of the year KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA told of the exploit of this valiant Komsomol organizer. While fighting a forest fire, when a group of young seamen was threatened with mortal danger, Warrant Officer Zharkov displayed courage, resolve and composure: he succeeded in leading them all out of the danger zone, but was unable to save his own life.

In his address at the 18th Komsomol Congress, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, stated: "Daily army and navy life abounds in examples of courage, self-sacrifice, and frequently heroism as well, the kind of heroism displayed by WO Aleksandr Zharkov. At a critical moment of danger for the subunit, Komsomol organizer Zharkov strode into the raging flames, rescuing his comrades.... All army and navy service develops, to use V. I. Lenin's words, 'heroic conscience'."

The deed of this wonderful Komsomol organizer will never be forgotten in the fleet. In the unit where Zharkov began his service, his weapon is now assigned to the best sentry. In the warrant officer school from which he graduated, a challenge prize has been established in his name for awarding to the best Komsomol organization. In the training detachment where he served as political section instructor for Komsomol activities, a hero's corner has been set up in each company, and at the patronaged secondary school the Pioneers have put together an exhibit dedicated to this man, whom they knew well and loved.

Zharkov's deed has not been forgotten, just as we have not forgotten the names of the valiant men of the Pacific Fleet who fought for the freedom of our homeland in the Great Patriotic War. Fleet youth is being indoctrinated in their wonderful examples, learning staunchness and courage.

The traditions of the older generations of Pacific Fleet personnel are living on and continuing. One of these traditions is a high sense of international duty. At the call of this duty 33 years ago, the men of this fleet, giving no thought to their own lives, liberated the brother people of Korea from the oppression of the Japanese militarists. At the call of

this duty they brought back to life the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, cleared mines from the Gulf of Suez, and came to the aid of the people of the island of Mauritius, who were disaster victims. Through their valor and industry, selflessness and benevolence, the men of the Pacific Fleet propagandize the Soviet way of life, strengthen the international prestige of the Soviet Union, and prove again and again that in our country the "man with a gun" is always a fighter for justice. This was reconfirmed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his address on board the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin." "We threaten nobody," he stated. "Talk of a so-called 'Soviet threat' is an obvious invention of the opponents of détente and nothing more. We are improving our defense for only one purpose: reliably to defend the achievements of the Great October Revolution and solidly to guard the peaceful labor of Soviet citizens, our friends and allies. The men of the Soviet Army and Navy serve this noble goal."

In his address on board the cruiser, L. I. Brezhnev expressed satisfaction with the fact that the men of the fleet and the fleet command have accomplished a great deal in mastering new equipment and improving the conduct of naval operations. Behind this high praise stands hard work by personnel to improve combat proficiency and to achieve high-quality performance of navigation problems and weapons exercises. Improvement in quality and efficiency of combat training is promoted by socialist competition and the campaign for leading combined units, ships and units. Excellent results were achieved by the initiator of competition in the Navy, the crew of the nuclear submarine under the command of Capt 1st Rank A. Kazakov. The officers, warrant officers, petty officers and enlisted personnel of this submarine are well aware of the responsibility they assumed in initiating competition. The crew of this nuclear submarine is working with enormous enthusiasm. On their last extended blue-water cruise they were to have a major test -- to launch a missile strike against an "adversary." The men performed in a situation maximally approximating actual combat. Every member of the crew performed with precision. As a logical result of this, the missile hit the target precisely.

The results of the winter and the first months of the summer period of combat training indicated that our initiators are firmly maintaining their leading position and lofty title of excellent ship. The percentage of specialists 1st class and master proficiency-rating personnel is always high on this submarine. The crew is known for its flawless discipline, firm friendship and mutual assistance. Businesslike rivalry and detailed totaling of results for each day at sea serve as a great impetus in achieving high results. For example, the men under WO A. Gudz' always know who is in front and who is lagging and what must be done to shape up. The men take an example from their leader, WO A. Gudz', the ship's top specialist. WO V. Shishkin, PO 2d Class G. Krinitsyn and other outstanding individuals are also a model in service performance. This crew will come through at all times and can be entrusted with the most responsible mission.

As commander of the fleet I am pleased to acknowledge that the majority of our crews are this kind, that there is taking place in the units and ships a persistent campaign to achieve the highest results in combat training and

that the quality of test performance is steadily improving. But this of course does not signify that we have corrected all deficiencies. We know what they are and we are working daily to correct them. Every member of the Pacific Fleet is well aware that it is his duty to justify the high praise given us by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during his visit to the fleet.

This spring we discharged into the reserves those men who had completed their term of service. People who had been tested by distant waters and gales entered the civilian economy. They have received excellent Pacific Ocean toughening. I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of them will do a worthy job in the bustling activities on the peaceful labor front. The fleet frequently receives letters from former men of the Pacific Fleet and from management personnel at those enterprises, construction jobs and kolkhozes where they are now working. We know that past members of the Pacific Fleet include Heroes of Socialist Labor, winners of state prizes, and people deserving of universal honor and respect. I believe we are correct in our belief that the conditioning and toughening they received in the navy has influenced their labor success. And the new generation will gradually become broken in, learning the fundamentals of navy science, taking over that wealth of experience amassed by their predecessors, becoming conditioned and toughened in the difficult training process. And this means that the glorious traditions of the fleet will continue, that the sea borders of our great homeland will remain inviolate in the future as well. The men of the Red-Banner Pacific Fleet -- true sons of the homeland -- are standing watch at sea in the name of this great and noble goal.

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Aboard a Large Antisubmarine Ship

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 78 signed to press 22 Jun 78 p 4

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Kosov, commanding officer of the Large ASW ship "Marshal Voroshilov": "Tested by Sea Duty"]

[Text] Our native shores disappeared in the haze. We were once again at sea. I returned in my mind to that cruise which took place during the visit to the fleet by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A special enthusiasm reigned at the action stations. And I as commanding officer was pleased to recognize that all the men, including the warrant officers, had put a great deal of labor into this cruise. These were experienced seamen, toughened and conditioned on distant ocean cruises. With some of them I had visited the most diversified regions of the World Ocean. They experienced their commander development before my eyes, grew to manhood from one training cruise to the next, little by little acquiring knowledge and practical skills.

Many good things, for example, can be said about WOs Rad Tech Serv A. Soldatov, O. Sukhoveyev, S. Kropotov, and others. They became crew leaders comparatively

recently, but they have already shown their excellence. They are all party members, have master proficiency ratings, and are reliable officer's assistants. And they have to some degree also become teachers for such officers as Lts A. Nikol'skiy and S. Berger. At any rate they expended a good deal of energy and effort in assisting A. Nikol'skiy, S. Berger and other young commanders in successfully mastering the computer hardware, teaching them solid skills in computer utilization.

Incidentally, since we have mentioned radiotechnical service, we should note that this is the leading subunit of the ship and unit. An important role in achievement of success by the radiotechnical service was played precisely by the warrant officers, who became an important support for their commanding officer in the area of strengthening military discipline, order, and combat readiness of the radiotechnical service as a whole. It is not surprising that Capt 3d Rank V. Bachurin always speaks of them warmly. Their skill, moral and physical qualities have been tested time and again on cruises, and they have always performed honorably in every tough situation. Right-flankers in socialist competition, outstanding performers in military labor Soldatov, Sukhovveyev, Kropotov and a number of other warrant officers have gone through an excellent school of naval proficiency on board their ship. They have visited tropical latitudes and cold northern waters; they have fought a typhoon, icing conditions and physical fatigue.

When at sea the commander of the ASW ship always keeps an eye on the operations of the sonar operators, air and surface surveillance operators, and navigator-radiometrists. As a rule I note that there is better order at those stations headed by experienced warrant officers. They take a good portion of the work load from the officers, serving as combat information center duty officers and running sonar teams. The men experience particularly heavy stress in the process of submarine search. Required for these operations are extreme composure and stamina, the ability precisely to classify a target and to prevent a deep submarine from evading pursuit.

It is one degree of complexity when the target is maneuvering and another when you yourself begin to introduce into the problem elements of heightened difficulty, changing course and speed, bringing the target into acute course angles, etc. And all this under conditions of intensive interference, under conditions maximally approaching combat. It is not easy on the sonarmen, particularly warrant officers. But they do not complain about difficulties. It is more likely to hear from them a sensible suggestion, valuable advice aimed at improving the training process, at improving the quality of work on angle of approach problems, and on improving methods of indoctrinational work.

Another reason it is beneficial to discuss things with them is that they have many interesting observations, examples from practical experience, and they possess extensive knowledge. After each such conversation one has, as it were, a new look at various phenomena, facts, and events.

Once, however, there was a discussion on the subject of cadre training. Warrant Officers Sukhoveyev, Soldatov and others asserted that alongside training of warrant officers at schools it would be useful to develop some of the specialists on board into warrant officers.

"Here is a candidate," they pointed to combat information center radio-metrist Sr Sn V. Kravtsov. I knew this man as a promising operator. At sea he performed confidently, and no errors in his performance had been noted.

Senior Seaman Kravtsov possessed secondary technical education. Our warrant officers had noted him some time ago and had suggested that he give some thought to his future, to a navy career. They succeeded in convincing this first-year man, and he agreed to continue service in the navy as a warrant officer.

We had not made a mistake with him. Warrant Officer Kravtsov is a fine specialist and does an excellent job. He also shown himself to be a skilled indoctrinator. As evidence we can cite an example involving PO 1st Class S. Kazanin. They began noticing that he was letting down in his work: he would be late to formation, or he would do a poor job setting up and posting details. No serious incidents occurred. V. Kravtsov and his assistant, CPO V. Lyubchenko, a young party member, found the way to approach this young commander and to bring him onto the straight and narrow. And yet Kravtsov, although a warrant officer, is younger than many military personnel on their first tour of duty. As we see, this does not keep him from performing his duties with precision.

And I am confident that soon there will be many more such as WO V. Kravtsov on the large ASW ship "Marshal Voroshilov." It is gratifying for me as commander to see how the warrant officers on our ship properly approach organization of the training and indoctrination process in their subunits. And this is no simple matter. Only a person who possesses excellent moral-fighting qualities and the ability to reach the mind and heart of each and every subordinate is able to indoctrinate a young sailor in a spirit of Communist morality and to make of him an active builder of communism.

Service on board ship is not easy. Affecting factors include the specific features of our life, long periods away from home, plus many others. Some warrant officers, still filled with memories of their recent graduation from warrant officer school, will suddenly become depressed. It is a good thing if he has experienced comrades alongside him. They will be able to square him away, as we say. And he will again become cheerful and energetic, and will again be proud of being a member of the crew of the large ASW ship "Marshal Voroshilov."

But the body of warrant officers does not become consolidated on its own. Much in this area depends on the commanding officer and his ability to unify people, to focus efforts on high-quality performance of the tasks assigned the ship. It is also important here to consider not only warrant officer training and shipboard routine but other aspects of life as well. For

example, providing a warrant officer's family with housing. I still remember the happiness radiating from the eyes of WO V. Kunich and his wife. They had been assigned a new apartment and had come to the gate to thank the commanding officer for his concern, sensitivity and attention.

Must we add that Kunich is now doing an even better job than before? Others, watching his performance, endeavor not to fall behind.

On that memorable cruise the entire ship's company performed flawlessly. The undersea target was quickly detected and was unable to evade pursuit. And we destroyed an air target which was swiftly approaching the ship. Considerable credit for the achieved success goes to the warrant officers, who have gained practical experience at sea. Each made his contribution to the overall success.

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Amphibious Landing Exercise Described

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[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Radchenko: "Landing with the Surf"]

[Text] Clouds had bunched up low over the shore, and an icy breeze was blowing in from the sea. The men in the boatswain's crew of the amphibious ship and everybody who was on-loading equipment was flicking away wind-produced tears and wrapping themselves more tightly into their foul weather gear and peajackets.

But Priymak was hot. Sweat streamed down his smooth-shaven, tanned face, and his sailor's striped shirt clung to his back. If he could only get rid of the clinging clothing, his movements would perhaps be more coordinated. There was no time.... Priymak, cautiously manipulating the controls, slowly drove the command vehicle onto the tank deck of the amphibious landing ship. The ramp squealed in protest under the vehicle's tracks. The dark entrance-way to the deck seemed to compress everything, engulfing both the driver and vehicle.

Warrant Officer Priymak had never before experienced such sensations. As a young sailor and later as a noncommissioned officer he had on hundreds of occasions, seated at the controls of an amphibian personnel carrier, driven with ease and simplicity onto the tight deck of the landing ship. Now, however, this maneuver seems unusually difficult. He was not accustomed to it, because this was practically the first time in his life he had driven a tank and, most important, had served in a totally new capacity -- tank company senior technician or, as the sailors called him, following old tradition, the zampotekh.

Strictly speaking, that which Ivan Arsent'yevich Priymak was presently doing was dictated neither by the complexity of the situation nor by the

requirements of service. The regular driver could have driven the company commander's tank onto the tank deck without any particular difficulty. However, as Priymak himself later explained, he wanted to feel the difference between driving a "bronik" [APC] and a tank. And now he was feeling this difference with every fiber of his being, as they say, and his brain was firmly storing away awareness of the degree of responsibility which from now on would be his because of the new position.

The men in his unit have long known that Warrant Officer Priymak is intimately acquainted with the equipment. "A hereditary trait," jokes Ivan Arsent'yevich. And during relaxation time he sometimes relates to the other men how he first became acquainted with equipment. It happened in his childhood. Once his uncle, a kolkhoz farm machine operator in Cherkasskaya Oblast, had seated Vanyukha in the cab of a ZIS and had driven him around the village. The little fellow naturally liked it, and he would disappear for days on end either to the kolkhoz threshing barn or with his uncle on hauls to the rayon grain elevator. The little fellow was meticulous in details. He tormented his uncle with questions. But the latter was pleased, and patiently explained and demonstrated.

Thus Ivan literally grew up on a truck and essentially became a driver long before he officially received his license. This latter took place just before his induction into military service, upon graduating from DOSAAF automotive school. At the rayon military commissariat the board members, scrutinizing this tall, athletically-built lad, a Komsomol leader at school, decided without vacillation: "He will make a fine amphibious assault trooper!"

Ivan Priymak was assigned to a guards naval infantry unit in the Twice Red-Banner Baltic Fleet. From the very first days in the service Seaman Priymak was driving an amphibian personnel carrier. He liked the vehicle -- an ominous appearance, but easy to drive, and it could handle any and all terrain.

Of course when Ivan first drove an APC onto the tank deck of a landing ship, there certainly was some nervousness. He also experienced stronger sensations at that time. In order to comprehend them, one must obviously experience them oneself. When the wheels of the personnel carrier roll off the ramp not onto solid ground but onto the choppy sea surface, one's first inclination is to want to jump up and leap out of the vehicle. But this is only a momentary feeling. Awareness of the fact that you are at the controls and that others stand behind you mobilizes the will and chases away momentary feelings of uncertainty and fear. Particularly when you hear the smooth drone of the engine and the hissing bubbling of the streams ejected by the water jets.

Forward, ever forward!

And when the beach pebbles are heard crunching under the wheels, now nothing can stop the swiftly-advancing naval infantrymen. The shore reverberates with a mighty shout by the assault troops.

At such moments Ivan Priymak felt almost physically his unity with the vehicle; an unusual inflow of energy welled up in him, and he was happy with

the awareness that he was a member of such a famous military arm as the naval infantry. Evidently this also predetermined his decision to remain for a second hitch, and then to become a warrant officer. He was placed in command of a platoon of armored personnel carriers. And the young platoon leader commanded in a manner worthy of a Communist. The platoon was rated excellent, and things proceeded without a hitch, as they say. And Priymak did not even think about any transfer. He became an APC driver 1st Class, completed a course of training at a correspondence motor transport technical school, and was intending to take examinations as an external student for a military secondary school.

And then suddenly the tank company commander requested that he transfer over to him as senior technician. "I am not a tanker," smiled Priymak, spreading his hands in a helpless gesture.

"With your experience and love of the equipment, it would not be difficult to become a tanker. I see no reason for doubts, Ivan Arsent'yevich. Come on!" the company commander firmly shook the warrant officer's hand.

Now, three years after our first encounter, Warrant Officer Priymak sees much in a different light. Yes, man always looks to the future, but unfortunately he cannot outstrip time and look into the future with his own eyes. At that time Ivan Arsent'yevich was not frightened by the difficulties of the new job. Having grown up in a large family (his parents had five children), he had been taught from childhood to work without complaining. Everybody noticed this trait in Priymak -- from his first squad leader to his present unit commander. Tank company commander Sr Lt Valeriy Vital'yevich Karpenko also knew and appreciated this trait. Therefore he was taking no risk in offering Warrant Officer Priymak the job of company senior technician. The company commander was absolutely convinced that Priymak would not let them down.

And Priymak in fact did not let them down.

Tank platoon leader Lt Viktor Bortnikov was the first to lend a helping hand to the new company senior technician. At the time Priymak joined the company, Lieutenant Bortnikov, a graduate of the Khar'kov Order of the Red Star Guards Higher Tank Command School imeni Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet was a driver 1st class and the top platoon leader. As a rule following field exercises he would be cited as an example to follow. He and Priymak immediately established a fine, close relationship, and Bortnikov was happy to help him master his new job.

Priymak lived up to his mentors' expectations. Two months after training classes began, Warrant Officer Priymak possessed pretty fair tank knowledge and did a good job of driving a tank. He learned how difficult this was to accomplish at the exercise mentioned at the beginning of this article. And he allowed himself no respite in his effort to master the new job as quickly as possible. And there was plenty to do. A mere listing of those items for which the company senior technician was personally responsible covers an entire printed page. Items include maintaining and keeping equipment in a continuous state of readiness, and preparation of vehicles for any type of activity -- field

exercises, practice drills, and upon their return -- inspection and needed preventive maintenance. When tanks are being serviced in the company, the senior technician's personal participation is obvious. But how much time does it take to prepare drivers to take proficiency rating tests? The senior technician is also responsible for all kinds of documentation and reports on tank maintenance. "So let's get moving, fellow," Priymak commanded himself, coming home only after the rest of the unit's officers and warrant officers were long since off duty.

The reward for all this work was the next proficiency rating examination for drivers, whom Priymak had personally trained. Almost none of those drivers are still in the company; they have been discharged into the reserves, but the warrant officer will remember them for a long time to come. Sgt Yuriy Maslov, senior mechanic-driver. Priymak is obliged to him for his first practical tank driving lesson. Maslov worked as a team with Lieutenant Bortnikov -- Bortnikov taught Priymak theory, and Maslov reinforced it with practical activity. Yuriy Maslov successfully passed the examination for 1st class. In addition to him, two others from Priymak's group became driver-mechanics 1st class: Sn Nikolay Bel'nyuk and Aleksey Lyushnenko.

The authority of the senior technician was formed and recognition achieved from all this. Particularly after those incidents which showed the warrant officer's personal qualities. Take the following incident. It was necessary to ready a combat-training tank for driving drills. Following proper procedure, Priymak inspected it, and discovered a problem: it was necessary immediately to replace the epicyclic turning unit belt and the brake belt.

This tank's regular driver-mechanic was Sn Aleksandr Gorbushin. Making an estimate of the work involved, Priymak asked him: "Can we handle it ourselves or shall we ask somebody to assist us?"

"The two of us cannot handle it, comrade warrant officer. Shall I get Seaman Lizenko?"

"Okay, call him in...."

It was easier for the three of them, of course. The warrant officer took the most difficult operations. When the entire unit was assembled they decided to call in Lieutenant Bortnikov so that he could help make adjustments. The vehicle was ready on schedule to leave for the training area. Of course in the company they already knew (not without the efforts of Seamen Gornushin and Lizenko) that "we've got some technician...."

At this time Priymak was engrossed in his own thoughts. He could see clearly that even his extra efforts were not enough to ensure that on days of intensive field exercises he alone could handle maintenance of all vehicles. Experience which had been proven in the armored personnel carrier platoon came in handy here as well. There he had known the capabilities of each driver and where each was particularly strong. And he would utilize each driver when needed.

For example, young driver Petrov heard valves clattering in his engine, but he did not really know how to correct the problem. Priymak sent him his deputy, Sgt Yuriy Matveychuk, known throughout the unit as an engine expert and particularly at adjusting valves. While they were on a march they lost the lights on another vehicle.

"Sergeant Perminov, give them some help!"

On all problems Priymak had indispensable assistants, thanks to whom the platoon's equipment never failed at an exercise.

Of course there were also such men among the tankers. Take Sr Sn Vasiliy Osadchiy, who drives the company commander's tank. He knows the vehicle inside out, but particularly the powerplant. "It is too bad that he will soon be discharged," the warrant officer said regretfully, "but right now he is conveying every bit of his know-how to Sn Sergey Kukharev."

"Or take Sn Vladimir Nikonov," Warrant Officer Priymak continued. "You should see how he drives a tank. Precision work!"

Ivan Arsent'yevich Priymak states these names with such warmth and affection that it is not difficult to understand the reason: he already has his apprentices in tanks as well. And as the old saying goes, only he who has worthy apprentices can call himself a master.

"Landing force prepare to disembark!"

Warrant Officer Priymak was already on the tank deck when the alert came. He had come down quite some time ago, checking with all the drivers to see if everything was in order. This time Priymak was disembarking as a tank platoon leader but, for understandable motives, was concerned not only about the platoon's equipment. The warrant officer knew that the actions of the naval infantrymen would be graded on the basis of the highest criteria -- the landing was being observed by the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

The landing ship's hull quivered. Priymak realized that they had touched shore. He immediately gave a command to his drivers: "Start your engines!" As soon as the doors opened and the ramp was dropped, Priymak's vehicle was the first to hit the beach. Following swiftly at its heels were the rest of the platoon's tanks, and to the left and right the company's tanks were clambering on shore together with the surf and advancing swiftly into battle.

The attack from the sea was swift and unstoppable, and was deservedly given a high mark by the Commander in Chief. Warrant Officer Priymak and his men were pleased by this praise. Of course he was pleased, aware that his own labor had played a part in achieving success.

When the battle died down the tanks assembled on a hill along a dirt road. Quiet reigned, interrupted only by the trills of skylarks. Sailors crowded around something at the edge of a wheat field. Priymak jumped to the ground and asked what was happening.

"There is a nest here, comrade warrant officer. A partridge...."

It seems that the nest was situated along the line of trenches. But the tough lads in their black berets displayed touching concern: they moved away to the side in order not to disturb the partridge.

Ivan Arsent'yevich smiled and noted to himself: "I'll have to tell the committee about this." Warrant Officer Priymak is a deputy to a local Soviet and a member of the nature conservation committee. The incident of the partridge nest is convincing evidence that these knights in black berets not only know how to fight fearlessly with the foe but can also touchingly protect nature.

A signal flare bursting over the field interrupted Warrant Officer Priymak's musings. It was a signal for the assault force to return to their ships.

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Technical Training of Young Navymen Described

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[Article by WO A. Tambovtsev: "Young Sailors Study"]

[Text] Young sailors V. Kravchenko, V. Dyachenko, S. Lozov and I. Kochkurkin reported for duty to the engineering subunit. They would have to be quickly taught to operate and service the equipment properly and independently to stand watch while under way: the ship was readying for an extended cruise. Master proficiency-rated team leader WO A. Lopat'ko proceeded with this difficult and responsible job.

It was soon determined that not all the young sailors were capable of quickly mastering their occupational specialty. For example, the group training method proved little-effective for Seaman Kravchenko. Section leader PO 2d Class A. Nikolayev then began working with him individually at the warrant officer's request. He did not alter the training schedule followed by the team leader in working with the rest of the men, but merely went through in detail with Kravchenko all unclear points and helped him expand his general technical knowledge. Soon Kravchenko caught up with the others.

As soon as the men had mastered the layout of the ship and their own area of responsibility, safety procedures in handling machinery and equipment, Lopat'ko placed emphasis on study of the main and auxiliary engine, the ship's fuel, air and other systems, as well as procedures for readying the engine for startup, engine operation, servicing and maintenance.

Teaching the men on this training schedule proved both effective and efficient. All of them promptly and successfully passed the tests qualifying them for unsupervised equipment operation and servicing.

It is true that initially some of the men, due to deficient practical skills, did make mistakes while on watch. Machinist Kravchenko, for example, on one occasion was standing watch on the diesel generator. At first everything went smoothly. But soon PO 2d Class Nikolayev noted a gauge indication of a sharp temperature increase. Reporting the situation to the combat department commander, Nikolayev quickly disconnected the generator from the load and stopped it. The generator had overheated because the machinist had failed to make a regular check of the coolant level in the expansion tank, had failed properly to monitor the water consumption indicator and had failed promptly to add water to the tank.

Similar mistakes were made by Seamen Dyachenko, Lozov, and Kochkurkin. On the warrant officer's advice, the section leader proceeded to analyze in detail each such incident, elucidating the men's weak areas in knowledge of the equipment operation procedures. He also began devoting greater attention to matters pertaining to detecting and preventing malfunctions. Assembling the men in the engine room, he explained to them the meaning, for example, of various indications given by the engine and oil-dropper units alongside the engine, taught them how indications of leaking determine a loose-fitting or broken line, a broken hose joint or rivet header, as well as how to use materials at hand to make minor equipment repairs.

Warrant Officer Lopat'ko also frequently conducted such training sessions. He demonstrated more efficient techniques of inspecting operating equipment. Based on his own many years of practical experience, he advised the men to inspect their areas of responsibility, with adequate lighting, from top downward, followed by a perimeter inspection.

"A superficial inspection of systems and equipment," the warrant officer stated, "is a hazardous practice. Here is a typical example. Once when the ship was at sea the oil level suddenly began rising in the circulating system, causing a pressure drop. We had to stop the engine. Disassembly showed that Sn V. Motus, who had inspected the equipment in base, had checked only the principal assemblies. He had not paid adequate attention to the lubrication system, in the assumption that since it had been operating properly it would continue to do so. There was a worn line, however, in the system. During engine operation oil leaked out into the crankcase, and from there into the tank, which cannot be permitted."

If the sailor had followed the manual, he would have inspected his area of responsibility section by section, testing the system under an operating load, preventing an equipment breakdown at sea.

Day by day the men increased their knowledge and acquired skills of handling their area of responsibility. Warrant Officer Lopat'ko moved to the final part of the training program -- repair training, typical malfunctions and ways to correct them. The team leader adhered to the following method. Let us say that they were going to perform preventive maintenance on a fresh-water pump. On the preceding day the warrant officer would distribute to his men appropriate technical documents and the maintenance manual, with instructions that they study them thoroughly.

At the designated time machinists Kravchenko, Dyachenko, Lozov, and Kochkurkin reported to the engine room, spread out a tarpaulin on the deck, and readied the tools, requisite replacement parts, grease, and rags. The warrant officer checked to ensure they mastered the procedure of pump disassembly and assembly. Convinced that the men were ready to work on their own, he instructed Kochkurkin to proceed with the job, while Kravchenko, Dyachenko and Lozov were to watch him carefully.

Kochkurkin disassembled the unit and inspected parts, replaced worn with new ones, greased them and reassembled the unit. When he began to test pump operation, however, he saw that the shaft was binding. Kochkurkin could not explain why. The warrant officer asked the other men to explain. Lozov approached the pump. Twice checking the shaft, he reported that it was jamming because the bearing clearances had not been properly adjusted. He was correct.

In teaching his men, Warrant Officer Lopat'ko extensively utilizes, alongside the textbook material, things which occur in daily practical activities.

At one of the occupational specialty training sessions the warrant officer related to his men how Sn V. Motus had inspected a compressor prior to putting out to sea. Completing his inspection, he changed the oil in the crankcase but failed to bolt the cover on tightly. When they fired it up, oil started leaking out. A compressor bearing overheated, and it had to be hastily replaced.

Checking to make sure his men had paid attention, Lopat'ko asked Seamen Kravchenko, Dyachenko, Lozov and Kochkurkin how they would have proceeded upon receiving the same instructions. The men gave an exhaustive reply, stressing that following equipment inspection it is essential to start up the compressor in order to make sure that everything has been done correctly.

The warrant officer then asked the men to cite examples from their own practical experience. Seaman Lozov gave an interesting example.

Prior to putting out to sea the engineering officer had ordered that the fuel filters be disassembled, cleaned and reassembled. The warrant officer instructed Lozov to perform this job. It seemed that Lozov had done the job right. But when he attempted to fire up the engine, it gave no sign of life. They proceeded to look for the problem. It turns out that Seaman Lozov in his haste had failed to observe certain points in the manual procedures: prior to firing up the engine he had failed to prime the pump and to bleed air out of the fuel system. As a result fuel was not feeding into the cylinders.

"This incident taught me a great deal," Lozov acknowledged to his comrades. "After that I never deviated from manual procedures."

A systematic approach, proper sequence and consistency in training enabled the young sailors to acquire considerable knowledge in a short period of time. On the extended cruise the men did a skilled job of equipment operation and maintenance and stood watch vigilantly. Now Kravchenko, Dyachenko, Lozov and Kochkurkin, entering socialist competition, have pledged to become proficiency-rated specialists in the year of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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WORK ON MISSILE FIRING SIMULATION SECTION DESCRIBED

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p 14

[Article by WO (Praporshchik) A. Forostyan: "Simulating Battle"]

[Text] At the range missile troops encounter a situation which demands a high degree of training, endurance, and flexible tactical thinking. This is because radio controlled targets are being put in the air and active and passive jamming is being carried on. But what will happen at ordinary training periods? It is perfectly simple, "made to order"; you do not send up planes nor create high target density and deep echeloning. Simulation equipment comes to our rescue here.

Senior Lieutenant Mikhaylov operates it in our battalion. And I am entrusted to help him simulate battle with an air enemy: write programs for conventional and comprehensive drills and carry out objective monitoring.

The first thing is to grasp the nature of the problems and standards being practiced, to understand the guidance officer and firer, the battalion commander, immediately. On the day before training periods we work out to the finest detail what targets must be simulated, how many of them, and how intensive the jamming should be. After all, for the operators the drill will only be useful if they must exert themselves to the full. Therefore, we prepare programs for the equipment so that it will not be child's play. The other extreme is equally bad. If the screens are too light and targets flash by at inconceivable speeds, this can only evoke distress and lack of confidence in operators.

Privates Anatoliy Ostrikov and Igor' Yershov see that the simulation and monitoring equipment is trouble-free. They have already learned from experience that the slightest technical delay may result in unproductive use of precious training time. Therefore, they always keep the equipment in good working order.

When guidance officer Sr Lt A. Makagon conducts the review of the drill and analyzes the actions of each operator, our full squad is right there at the missile guidance station. It is very important for us to know the strong and weak points in the training of our specialists and to learn what corrections need to be made in the models we have built.

Sr Lt V. Mikhaylov keeps up on the development of weapons and familiarizes us with characteristic features of the tactics of fighting high- and low-flying targets.

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INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLE DRIVER TRAINING DESCRIBED

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p 15

[Article by Sgt V. Kokorev, mechanic-driver 1st class: "Operating the Infantry Combat Vehicle"]

[Text] We reconnaissance troops often work in the most difficult conditions. We cross sectors of obstacles and devastation and are the first to advance along difficult routes. The infantry combat vehicle has long since become our tested combat helper. It is a highly maneuverable, fast vehicle with significant off-road capability. Many times traveling through swamps, mud, sand, and clay we have seen its excellent technical qualities reaffirmed. It is also able to cross water obstacles on the surface.

If the infantry combat vehicle's capabilities are to be used, the mechanic-driver must give it timely servicing and operate it correctly. But skill comes with experience, which must be acquired in hard, daily training. To step up the training process each specialist in our sub-unit tries to pass on his knowledge to less experienced comrades. Reviewing the mistakes of young soldiers and carefully analyzing every case of improper treatment of the equipment is very useful. This refers above all to driving.

I recall how mechanic-drivers Privates A. Artykov and Kh. Mirbobayev operated somewhat differently at first. Artykov drove the vehicle as if he were afraid of spilling a precious load. Even on a good road he would not shift into high gear and the ICV [Infantry Combat Vehicle] dragged along with heart-rending groans from the engine. Mirbobayev, by contrast, squeezed everything he could out of the vehicle regardless of the road. He simply refused to understand that driving this way could knock out the shock absorbers, torsion bars, and other assemblies. A good deal of individual work was required with each soldier before they acquired the necessary "feeling for speed."

However, the ability to choose the correct speed alone is not enough for correct driving. It is important to practice all actions involved with driving the ICV to the point of automatism. Otherwise it is even possible that a vehicle may break down, as happened with Pvt S. Barannik, for example, during a march. Private Barannik burned out the driven disk of the main clutch. They were able to fix the problem quite quickly, but this example provided the occasion for serious discussion in the technical study group.

The reason for the breakdown was simple. The mechanic-driver was shifting gears incorrectly; he was releasing the main clutch pedal too slowly. The main clutch is engaged smoothly only when the vehicle is being started from a stop. When it is moving the pedal must be released more sharply so that the washers on the metal disks of the clutch do not become overheated from friction.

At the training period it was also learned that mechanic-drivers sometimes make involuntary mistakes in driving, for example braking the vehicle without pushing the clutch pedal all the way down. The clutch disks will wear out quickly in such a case.

The ability to use the full range of gears when driving is also an important condition for skillful operation of the ICV. We teach young mechanic-drivers to shift gears as often as necessary in view of the terrain. Failure to do this every time results in a lower average speed on the route.

The ICV has one special design feature, the possibility of shifting down without using the main clutch. There is a delayed shifting lever on the steering column for this purpose. The force of the vehicle's thrust can be increased quickly using this lever. This is invaluable to mechanic-drivers in various road situations. For example, I had to use this capability at exercises when crossing swampy terrain.

After preliminary reconnaissance of the swamp and selecting the direction of movement I shifted into second gear and drove straight ahead, holding the gas pedal steady. The ICV moved along smoothly and confidently. When the ground suddenly became worse I had to shift into first. But there was some danger in performing this operation because the vehicle could become stuck in the swamp when the tracks tore away the top layer of the ground during the change of speed. Therefore, I switched the delayed shift lever and continued going without changing engines RPM's. I was able to cross the difficult sector.

We are constantly reminding soldiers in their first year of service about the special features of driving on different kinds of terrain. Violating established driving rules leads to serious problems. For example, Pvt. A. Simonov, traveling through a swamp on an explored route, decided to change the route slightly. He did not like the fact that the vehicle was being shaken up on the hillocks. After a moment's thought the mechanic-driver turned onto the adjacent,

smoother sector. As a result the ICV became stuck in the muck of the swamp and had to be pulled out.

We also devote significant attention to teaching mechanic-drivers to maneuver correctly at different speeds. For example, Pvt A. Zav'yalov said that when turning he was unable to choose a correct speed and therefore either failed to meet the time standard or risked going into the ditch. Specialists from the subunit demonstrated their driving skills at demonstration training periods and pointed out Zav'yalov's incorrect actions to him.

I had to show how to make a smooth turn on hard ground without slowing down. I knew from experience that the ICV was very stable and therefore, allowing the vehicle to slide slightly, a fairly sharp turn could be made. At the training period I was able to make a 180 degree turn at 45-50 kilometers an hour with a very short turning radius. On soft ground, of course, such a maneuver is not possible. In this case the resistance to turning increases sharply and increasing the speed may cause the vehicle to tip over.

Sgt A. Ivanov demonstrated the ability to maneuver in sand. A rain had fallen before his demonstration and driving conditions were much worse. He could not make sharp turns in the wet sand; there was a danger that the tracks would come off the drive wheel. Therefore, the experienced mechanic-driver made his turn, so to speak, in steps. He would turn the steering column until the track began to come out, and then he would straighten the wheel again. In this way he was able to make a full turn at 20 kilometers an hour in a radius of 15 meters.

Young mechanic-drivers are sometimes tempted to go at top speed on concrete and asphalt roads. But experience shows that traveling faster than 40 kilometers an hour becomes dangerous because the contact between the tracks and the road surface is minimal. Any abrupt maneuver or change in speed leads to a loss of control and the ICV begins slipping across the road as if it were ice and may even tip over into the ditch.

If it is necessary to complete a march at top speed in line with the assigned mission, however, we proceed as follows. We drive the vehicle steadily, at a constant speed, and try to use the steering column as little as possible.

Driving the ICV in limited visibility, especially at night, is also very difficult for mechanic-drivers. The rules of reconnaissance or performance of other combat training missions at night often will not permit even light-camouflaging devices. The only help in such conditions is a night vision instrument. A specialist must have solid professional skills to drive an ICV using such an instrument. Therefore, every beginning reconnaissance soldier in our subunit drives the vehicle at night along the very same route several times, practicing perception of the terrain using a night vision instrument.

When passing on our know-how to newcomers we also direct their attention to such matters as careful preparation of the ICV for driving, crossing water obstacles, and the ability to keep a constant watch on the readings of control instruments. It is essential to us, reconnaissance forces, that every soldier be a rated specialist. Only then will the subunit be able to perform its assigned combat mission.

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INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS DESCRIBED

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[Article by Col-Engr Yu. Burtsev, candidate of technical sciences:
"The Infantry Combat Vehicle"]

[Text] The armored, tracked infantry combat vehicle known as the BMP-1 is one of the types of armored equipment that has markedly improved the offensive might of motorized rifle subunits. Its design features significantly distinguish this vehicle from other armored equipment. The power compartment is located in the front on the right. It contains the engine and main clutch, gearbox with planetary gears which are joined in a single unit, an oil tank with the heater pan and reducer, the cooling system block with air cleaner, the heating system assemblies, compressor, water pump, and other equipment.

The battle compartment, set in the middle part of the body and turret, contains the regulation vehicle weapon and set of ammunition, observation and firing instruments, and an exhaust fan. A seat is mounted on a suspended, revolving platform, and there is a hatch for the gunner-operator in the roof of the turret. A place is provided on the right side for placing a light antiaircraft rocket complex, and on the engine bulkhead canisters of the automatic firefighting system are mounted.

The control compartment is located in the forward part of the vehicle between the left side of the body and the engine compartment bulkhead. It has entry hatches and work positions for the mechanic-driver and commander and their viewing instruments for work in daylight and at night. Next to the mechanic-driver are a panel of control instruments, means of starting and controlling the vehicle's movement on land and in the water, a gyrosemicompass, pneumatic system apparatus, and an intercom device. The commander's working position has a radio set and the commander's intercom.

The troop compartment, which occupies the rear part of the body, is divided into two chambers by the primary fuel tank and the storage

battery containers. Places are fitted out for motorized riflemen in each of these chambers.

The working positions for four soldiers are seats which may be set in traveling or fighting position. There are four hatches in the roof of the troop compartment and two doors with fuel tanks in the rear. In addition, the troop compartment has drawers for food, a water pump, the pump of the heat and smoke unit, air ducts to distribute decontaminated air to the troops, an air intake pipe, fans to remove powder gases, two storage batteries, holders for a grenade thrower and light antiaircraft complex, and other equipment.

The power plant is based on a V-shaped six-cylinder, four-stroke diesel engine specially built for the BMP-1.

The engine is protected against water when the vehicle is crossing water obstacles by wise placement of the telescoped eduction pipe and the use of automatic valves to prevent water reaching the engine from the air cleaner and through the exhaust collectors.

The hydromechanical power transmission used in the vehicle makes it possible to change the torque of the engine in a broad range to adapt to various road conditions. It consists of a main clutch, six-step gearbox, and two planetary turning mechanisms joined in a common housing.

Power transmission is controlled by mechanical gears that affect hydraulic elements and mechanisms of the hydraulic servosystem. The vehicle is turned by turning the steering wheel. The gearshift lever (on the right) and the reducing gear lever (on the left) are mounted on the steering column. The improved design of the BMP-1's power transmission combined with convenient controls, make it easier to drive the vehicle and reduce mechanic-driver fatigue.

The vehicle moves across land and water by means of a caterpillar drive with the drive wheels located in front and with lantern-wheel gearing. The light, thin-linked design of the tracks, which are connected by rubber-metal joints, allows the vehicle to travel at high speed on land and make long runs without replacing the tracks.

The vehicle moves across water by means of the reaction to the stream of water created by the lower runs of the rewinding tracks. The speed of the vehicle in water is increased by the design of its fenders which have a special guide apparatus which turns the stream created by the lower runs in the opposite direction.

As a result of the improved design of the power transmission of the track drive and good suspension the vehicle reaches a maximum speed of 65 kilometers an hour on the highway. The low value of mean specific pressure on the ground gives the vehicle increased off-road

capability in swampy and snow-covered sectors of terrain. The infantry combat vehicle has modern weapons including a 7.62 millimeter PKT coaxial machine gun and an antitank guided missile complex. This is all located in the revolving turret.

The firepower of the BMP-1 is increased by equipping it with embrasures and viewing instruments that allow the troop complement to fire their weapons on the run and from short stops without leaving the vehicle. The troop compartment has eight heated periscope devices and embrasures with hinged mountings for two light machine guns and six automatic weapons. Boxes loaded with machine gun belts and cartridges are set along the sides of the compartment. In addition, the vehicle has an RPG-7 hand-held grenade launcher and grenades which can be used through the open hatches in the roof of the troop compartment.

When it is necessary to operate outside of the vehicle this weapon can easily be removed from the embrasures and the assault party can leave the vehicle secretly through the doors.

The crew of the BMP-1 is armed with AKM automatic weapons, F-1 grenades, and a signal pistol with cartridges. The considerable firepower of the BMP-1 combined with its modern instrument complex, including day, night, and combined observation instruments and orientation instruments, creates excellent opportunities for the vehicle to accomplish fire missions at any time of the day or night.

The battle team of the vehicle consists of the crew (mechanic-driver, gunner-operator, and commander) and the riflemen, a motorized rifle squad of assault troops.

The BMP-1 has improved means to protect the battle team and equipment against conventional means of fire, nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, and against fire and sinking when the body is damaged in the water. The vehicle also has heat-smoke equipment to lay down a smoke screen.

The primary protection for the battle team and equipment is the vehicle's allaround armor. The front part of the body and turret are capable of withstanding the action of the shells used in foreign armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles.

In case of a nuclear explosion the protection system insures automatic shutdown of the engine, closing of the engine louvres stopping the ejector and valves of the fan of the turret and troop compartment, stopping the fans and supercharger, turning off the electric drive of the turret, and switching on the absorbent filter air delivery system. After the shock wave passes the mechanic-driver should turn on the supercharger, which provides delivery of decontaminated air at surplus pressure into the inhabited compartment of the vehicle.

When toxic or radioactive substances are detected the system automatically closes the chokes of the fans, stops their drive engines, and connects the absorbent filter into the air ducts.

Thus, the excellent fire and operating capabilities of the BMP-1 together with reliable protection of the crew against various types of weapons allow us to conclude that motorized rifle subunits have the very latest combat equipment.

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COMMENTS ON NATO AIR-CUSHION VEHICLES

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[Article based on foreign press material: "Air-Cushion Boats"]

[Text] A characteristic feature of the current phase of development of fighting ships abroad is the use of dynamic principles of support, hydrofoils and air cushion. They make possible a sharp increase in speed. However, as the foreign press observes, the possibility of increasing speed is not the only advantage of using the new modes of travel. Air cushion ships have a fundamentally new and extremely valuable quality: they are amphibious. The first air cushion vessels appeared in the early 1960's and immediately drew the interest of the naval command of the NATO countries. Foreign navies today have several hundred air cushion vessels of various types (commercial, sport, and naval) built by series production and on an experimental basis.

Air cushion ships are subdivided by design into two basic types, amphibious and skeg or nonamphibious. The basic idea in building fast air cushion ships is to reduce the resistance to ship movement by forming a layer of compressed air under its bottom which raises the ship above the water.

The hulls of amphibious ships are completely lifted off the water when they move, and therefore they can come out on the shore and move across land, crossing various obstacles in their path at heights approximately equal to the height of the flexible guard (about 1.2 meters for 10-ton ships and 2.2-2.4 meters for ships weighing more than 100 tons). Air propellers are ordinarily used as propulsion devices for amphibious ships.

The nonamphibious air cushion ships have side plates or keels called "skegs," which are submerged in the water when the ship moves. They are propelled by water-jet or special screw propellers. Skeg ships can only move along the water surface. Their main shortcomings are

significantly fewer opportunities to increase speed because of the abruptly increasing resistance of the side keels and the fact that such ships are not amphibious.

The principal characteristics of air cushion ships which determine to a significant degree their fighting qualities are their speed, seaworthiness, safety, and amphibious qualities. The reliability and cost of building them are also important.

Air cushion ships are substantially faster than ships with other principles of movement when traveling in quiet water. However, as the foreign press reports, the maximum cruising speed is not what is used to evaluate these ships, but rather it is the average "technical" speed which is determined with due regard for the time required to build up speed, brake, and tie up. Difficulties placing power plants and propeller-rudder complexes on amphibious ships limit their weight. For example, specialists of the French Sedam firm believe that the maximum weight of amphibious air cushion ships must not exceed 350-400 tons. In this case it is possible to provide maximum traveling speeds of up to 100 knots.

Skeg ships may be significantly larger. In France, for example, a skeg air cushion ship weighing 1,000 tons that travels under 100 knots an hour is under development. Work is underway in England to design an air cushion ship of up to 3,000 tons with a cruising range of 3,500 miles and traveling speed of 80 knots.

For fighting boats the ability to maintain high speed in waves is more important than the maximum speed attainable in quiet water. Virtually all foreign air cushion ships are equipped with special flexible guards or "skirts" to increase seaworthiness and crossing capability. This guard consists of a system of flexible curtains consisting of multilayered rubberized fabric secured along the entire perimeter of the ship's bottom. The design of the flexible guard usually includes the ship's nozzle device. However, the height of the skirt is limited by stability requirements and therefore itself limits seaworthiness.

In the opinion of foreign specialists air cushion ships displacing 120 tons can be operated at speeds on the order of 40-50 knots in four-point waves. Such ships can remain safely at sea in waves of up to five points. Ships displacing 250-500 tons and traveling at about 50-60 knots are figured for waves up to five points.

In addition to seaworthiness the cruising safety of air cushion vessels is very important. Even mild collisions may damage their skirts and the air cushion will be lost. Despite the fact that an air cushion ship has great initial stability in stormy conditions like a raft or catamaran, this stability decreases abruptly at certain angles of roll and capsizing is possible. A sharp list may be caused by serious damage to the plating on one side and a drop in pressure in the air cushion or by damage to the central longitudinal inflatable keel.

An important advantage of air cushion ships over all other known combat equipment today is their exceptionally great amphibious qualities. Where the ships are used for landing, patrol, and transport operations this quality is difficult to overrate.

Foreign specialists have different opinions concerning the vulnerability of fighting boats with different principles of motion. Some believe that because of the low silhouette conventional planing boats should be detected by enemy air cushion ships at shorter range and, therefore, may approach closer to them and use missiles with shorter firing ranges than the air cushion ship can. There is also another opinion, based on the fact that the effective reflecting surface depends more on the length of the silhouette than on its height. Therefore, air cushion ships, which have shallower bottoms than conventional boats, are capable of performing the same mission and will have an advantage over them because the enemy cannot detect them until shorter range.

Air cushion ships are much less subject to detection by submarine sonar stations. According to foreign press reports, the greatest advantage of air cushion ships is their invulnerability to mines and torpedoes because of the reduced intensity of their physical fields and small submerged volume.

Scientific research and experimental projects carried out in England, the United States, and other countries to build air cushion ships have made it possible to define the area of use of these ships in various combat operations.

According to reports by foreign specialists, air cushion ships can be used successfully as patrol and missile boats, small antisub defense ships, and in minesweeping and landing operations. In addition, these ships may be used by ground forces.

Air cushion patrol boats have received most extensive development in the English Navy. The English SR-N5 and SR-N6 patrol boats, which went into series production in 1972, have a 900 horsepower plant that produces speeds up to 60 knots. The ships have a cruising range of 250 miles and can operate autonomously for four hours.

Three variations of weaponry are envisioned for SR-N6 ships. The first has one doubled 30 millimeter artillery gun and a 7.62 millimeter machine gun. The second has two multibarreled 20 millimeter turret artillery guns with remote control. The third variation has two antiship Harpoon missiles with a remote control system connected to a Decca radar set and a 7.62 millimeter machine gun.

As the foreign press notes, a great advantage of air cushion patrol boats is the possibility of patrolling in bad weather and in shallows, mud, and the like. These capabilities were identified in 1966 during

testing of the SR-N5 air cushion ship in the northwest part of Canada in stormy seas, on the tundra, on frozen lakes, and on the Mackenzie River during the period of ice flow.

In 1972 the English Navy began series construction of BH.7 air cushion ships in a patrol variation. This boat will be armed with a ship-to-ship or ship-to-air missile complex and high-speed artillery guns with remote control. Iran has placed an order for four of these ships. They weigh 50 tons and have a net load of 14 tons (two missile launchers can be mounted on each boat). In quiet water they go 60 knots, and with waves of 1.4 meters their speed is 37 knots.

NATO naval specialists have recently been studying the possibility of using air cushion ships in minesweeping operations.

Foreign specialists have calculated that one air cushion minesweeper can replace eight conventional sweepers costing 15 million dollars apiece. In view of this, the foreign press considers it expedient to spend 120 million dollars for research on building an ultramodern air cushion sweeper. This sweeper would weigh 60-80 tons, making it possible to transport them to the operations region in support ships. In turn this broadens the possibilities of using air cushion ships as sea and ocean sweepers.

In the view of NATO military specialists the English BH.7 and SR-N6 air cushion ships are most promising for minesweeping purposes. According to statements in the foreign press these ships have clear advantages over water-displacing sweepers in conducting antimine operations. In the first place, they are not susceptible to underwater explosions because their hulls are not in contact with the water. In the second place, they are less vulnerable to anchored and ground influence mines. A ship of this type, the Wellington, participated in one of the English Navy's antimine exercises off the coast of the United States.

Considering the great speed capability of air cushion ships compared to the speed of submarines, NATO naval specialists believe that air cushion ships can be used successfully against submarines.

The Mk.6, a special variation of the BH.7 ship, has been developed for use as an antisub ship. This ship has a maximum speed of 120 kilometers an hour, a cruising range of 800 kilometers, and is armed with torpedo launchers and a Mk.105 hydroacoustic mine-seeking set.

In 1971 the English firm Vosper Thornycroft designed a multipurpose amphibious air cushion ship which, in its antisub variation, has two small triple-tube torpedo launchers to fire Mk.44 and Mk.46 self-guiding antisub torpedoes, and a variable depth echo-ranging system with a 180 meter line. With one engine and a speed of 45 kilometers an hour this ship can operate independently for 40 hours and has a

cruising range of 1750 kilometers. It can be used in a mine sweeping variation. In this case it is armed with sweeps and equipment to seek and destroy mines.

Development of an antisub variation of the air cushion ship is being carried on in the French Navy as well, where the Sedam firm has proposed two designs for such ships: the Naviplan No 500 and the Naviplan No 300. The No 500 will be armed with a Malafoon antisubmarine guided missile complex, while the No 300 will have new types of antisub torpedoes.

Antisubmarine variations of the air cushion ship are also being developed in the U.S. Navy.

Analysis of foreign reports demonstrates that the further development of air cushion ships is pursuing improved fighting and operating qualities.

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INTEGRATED APPROACH TO MILITARY INDOCTRINATION DESCRIBED

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[Article by Lt Gen N. Shevkun, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "A Comprehensive Approach to Indoctrination"]

[Text] We are all witnesses of the enormous attention given by our party to the questions of ideological work and its further improvement at the present stage of mature socialism. We are aware that this is due primarily to the rise in the scale and the deepening of the socioeconomic changes being carried out in our nation. At present there is particular timeliness to the vital Leninist thought that "the more profound the transformation which we wish to carry out, the more the interest in this and an aware attitude must be raised, and to convince ever new millions and tens of millions of the necessity of this" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 42, p 140).

The party proceeds from the fact that in a society of developed socialism, the work of the communist indoctrination of the masses grows in significance. The dynamic nature of social life, the entry of new generations of people into it, the greater awareness and the greater degree to which the people are informed and the changeover to intensive production methods--all of this places higher demands upon all the work in the masses. It is also essential to consider the continuous intensification in the ideological struggle between the two systems and the more active nature of imperialist propaganda which is becoming evermore refined. In the struggle of the two ideologies, high political awareness is essential as well as active, effective and convincing propaganda work, and a prompt rebuff of enemy ideological subversion.

In generalizing the party's experience in improving ideological work, the 25th CPSU Congress clearly defined the scope and content of the tasks in the area of communist indoctrination, and established the necessity of a solution to them on a basis of a comprehensive approach. "...Present-day conditions," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th Party Congress, "raise new tasks for the ideological activities of the party. The practice

of party organizations suggests to us the way by which we can achieve greater effectiveness in it. This is a comprehensive approach to organizing the entire question of indoctrination, that is, ensuring a close unity of ideological-political, labor and moral indoctrination considering the particular features of the various groups of workers."

In being guided by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations of our district have worked constantly on raising the question of the communist indoctrination of the personnel to the level of today's needs, and improving its effectiveness on the basis of a comprehensive approach. Here we consider the task of tasks to be the attaining of an organic unity in ideological-political, labor, military, moral and legal indoctrination considering the particular and unique features of each branch of troops, the different military collectives and categories of servicemen, and making certain that ideological work encompasses all spheres of military activity and all the personnel.

In order to make optimum use of all the means, forms and methods of indoctrination, and to group them into an integrated system, it is essential to have not only the objective but also the subjective conditions. As for the main objective conditions, they are at hand. The Soviet soldier, like each citizen of our nation, lives and works in a social milieu which makes a maximum contribution to his ideological growth and spiritual development. The entire socialist system, the Soviet way of life, and the very nature of service in the new type of army contribute to the clear-purposed indoctrination of our military. It is a question of making maximum use of the subjective factors and improving the role of the conscious organizing principle in controlling the process of indoctrination.

The ideological efforts of the commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations are focused primarily on developing communist awareness and shaping communist conviction. Precisely it, communist conviction, ultimately is the main thing which motivates the conduct of the Soviet military both in peacetime as well as during the days of the trials of war. The task of inculcating such conviction is carried out comprehensively, in all areas of indoctrination. And the leading role here is played by ideological-political indoctrination. In the army, as is known, the basic forms for the ideological tempering of the personnel are the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers, political studies for the warrant officers ["praporshchik"], and the political exercises with the soldiers and sergeants. Our own experience shows that where the commanders, political bodies and party organizations pay unflagging attention to these forms, things go better. Here is an example. In the unit where Officer A. Shibanov is the political worker, Marxist-Leninist training of the officers has been well organized, and the questions of their ideological growth are a matter of particular concern for the communists who are the leaders of this unit and the party organizations. Here in the theoretical training, in addition

to lectures and seminars, they widely practice the preparation of abstracts, the holding of colloquiums, theoretical and procedural conferences as well as reviews of political literature. Lenin readings and information sessions on political subjects are organized for the officers. The questions of ideological tempering are regularly discussed in the party organizations. The hearing of reports by the communists at party meetings on their work to improve political knowledge has been reduced to a system. All of this has told positively in deeds. The ideological tempering arms the officers with a more profound knowledge of the tasks posed for them by life itself, and impels them to work at full strength and to constantly increase successes in military and political training.

Many of the units and subunits of our district have acquired a good deal of experience in the ideological-political indoctrination of the officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers. Along with the leading forms of political training for the personnel, in the ideological development of the men a marked role has also been played by the political indoctrination measures carried out by the political workers and by the party and Komsomol activists. The lectures and talks, the special subject evening meetings and consultations, the discussion of books and meetings with party veterans and participants of the Great Patriotic War--this is a far from complete list of all there is in the arsenal of forms of work for the party and Komsomol organizations and what contributes actively to the development of a communist ideology in the men.

The officers of the political directorate spare no effort in their work of generalizing and propagandizing advanced experience in ideological-political indoctrination. For example, we have generalized the experience which has been acquired in the Iron Division as well as in the formation where Officer Ye. Surtayev is one of the political department workers. At the same time we do not tolerate instances when the study of theory and policy is conducted in isolation from the practice of communist construction or those tasks which are being carried out by the district troops, or when the independent work of the officers has been poorly organized and the attendance rate at exercises is low.

We give great significance to eliminating these and other shortcomings in ideological-political indoctrination. We constantly see to it that each propagandist is concerned with improving the quality of political training for the men, and profoundly analyze its content and results.

The political directorate keeps close watch over making certain that the commanders, political bodies and party organizations, in implementing a comprehensive approach, more fully combine ideological-political indoctrination with labor indoctrination, and with developing in each serviceman a conscientious attitude toward military labor and a desire to master the weapons and military equipment and to make one's contribution to the success of the subunit, unit, formation and district. As is known, labor indoctrination under army conditions in a way merges with military indoctrination which, being communist indoctrination in terms of its ideological

essence, in unity with the other forms of indoctrination develops in the servicemen such qualities as loyalty to one's duty to the motherland, vigilance, steadfastness, and a profound aware desire to improve military skills, and all those qualities which are essential for the military for successfully defending the victories of socialism. These are shaped on the basis of communist ideological conviction in the process of the military and political training of the men and all their service. Certainly, if this process is organized in strict accord with the requirements of modern combat. For this reason the political directorate endeavors to make it a general rule that concern for the proper organization of military training is also concern for indoctrinating true fighters able at any minute to carry out any given mission, no matter how complex it may be. We have published a book on the Carpathians Exercise and this brings out the experience of party political work in preparing for and during these exercises, in the process of firing and driving military vehicles, flights, including combat use, in carrying out other combat training missions. This book has become a good aid in the work of the commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol activists in indoctrinating soldierly qualities in the men.

The socialist competition opens up a broad field for activities of not only our commanders but also all ideological workers. This is an important lever in improving the quality of military labor, and it helps to develop in the competitors an aware attitude toward fulfilling military duty, and a desire to always be in front and to carry out ones service duties as well as possible. In actively carrying out the basic principles of the competition (publicity, comparison of results, the dissemination and introduction of advanced experience) we constantly see to it that the units and subunits more fully consider the moral aspects of competition, that in the course of the struggle to fulfill the high pledges our men develop such remarkable qualities as friendship and comradeship, and that inevitably the deed follow their word.

And here we feel is the very time to say that a comprehensive approach makes high demands upon the moral indoctrination of the Soviet people, including our military. And if the ideological-political indoctrination contributes actively to a profound understanding by each man of the aims and tasks of communist construction and the honorable and responsible missions of the Soviet Armed Forces to defend the socialist fatherland, moral indoctrination pursues the aim of giving an individual focus to the solving of these problems, and to developing in the men a moral ideal which impels them to active social activities and operates as a motive in activity and a means of self-indoctrination. The main aim of moral indoctrination, as was pointed out by the 25th CPSU Congress, is to develop an active vital position. And the moral ideal in solving this problem is an unique compass and guideline. Under army conditions, the moral indoctrination of the personnel is permeated by the specific provisions of the oath and military regulations and these embody the legal standards and principles of communist morality.

The creation of a healthy moral climate in a military collective and the shaping of a situation of strict reciprocal exactingness, demandingness, and irreconcilability for any deviations from the military regulations and standards of communist morality--these questions are discussed in the district party and Komsomol organizations and at meetings of the personnel in the companies, batteries and squadrons. Much that is useful in this area is being done by the cultural and educational facilities particularly the Uzhgorod, Khmel'nitskiy and Zhitomir garrison officer clubs. The questions of communist morality hold a suitable place in the mass agitation work, as well as in the legal and aesthetic indoctrination of the servicemen and the members of their families.

Unfortunately, as yet not all the leaders of military collectives have understood the increased significance of the moral indoctrination of the personnel as an organic part of the comprehensive approach. For instance, in the unit where Officer V. Komarov serves, until recently in the practices of mass political work there were no interesting lectures, reports, youth debates or special evening meetings on the rules of the socialist community, on moral and ethical standards of conduct, and on the moral duty of the soldier and citizen. The political directorate had to intervene and remind certain officials of the well known truth that where they forget the necessity of a constant and steadfast struggle for the minds and hearts of the men, inevitably there are the remains of an alien ideology and deviations from the socialist standards of morality.

In speaking of moral indoctrination of the men, I would like to emphasize that here as nowhere else one can clearly see the role of the personality of the indoctrinator himself, his moral purity, his erudition and political and cultural viewpoint. To awaken finer feelings in the conscience of a soldier, in his heart, not only by one's word or deed but also by one's personality itself, and by that internal world and spiritual experience which one has acquired oneself--this is what we constantly teach the indoctrinators. In our district there are many indoctrinators whose experience is widely propagandized by the political directorate. For example the political workers officers Ye. Surtayev, Yu. Nechitaylo and S. Feopentov, the company commander Sr Lt A. Novgorodtsev, and many others. The exactingness of these comrades on their subordinates is high. But the men are aware that their senior comrades place even higher demands on themselves, and this impels the soldiers and sergeants to more severely judge their every step and action, to go farther in military training and attain more. Understandably authority did not come to these officers by itself. The basis of their success is hard work. For example, take Sr Lt S. Feopentov. Regardless of his heavy workload with daily concerns, this officer finds time to turn for advice to the books of A. Makarenko and V. Sukhomlinskiy, and to become acquainted with new artistic literature. Sergey Aleksandrovich [Feopentov] is interested in music and painting, poetry and sports. His home library would be envied by many. The officer's interests are his invisible assistants in indoctrination work with the men. And of course, there is a direct link between the profoundly meaningful measures carried out by the political worker in the subunit and the success of the battalion which for a long time has had the title of outstanding.

It, this link, also exists between the personality of Sr Lt Novgorodtsev and the successes of the company which he commands and which for 3 years has been outstanding. The same link can be clearly traced everywhere that the indoctrinator, be he a commander or political worker, constantly is guided by the rule that an increase in success is attained only by the person who constantly grows himself in all regards.

In endeavoring to ensure a close unity in ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination, we constantly strive for a correct determination and utilization of all the means, forms and methods of indoctrination encompassing all the personnel and considering the various categories, as well as ensuring an ideological influence on all types of military activity. How is this problem solved in the troops of our district?

We feel that we held an instructive and useful practical scientific conference for the chiefs of the political bodies and called "Practical Work of the Political Departments in Achieving a Comprehensive Approach in Solving the Problems of Personnel Training and Indoctrination." Its participants discussed with interest such crucial problems as improving the planning and organization of ideological work, the role of the organized system of control over the indoctrinational process, a regular check and analysis of the effectiveness of the measures undertaken and the prompt incorporation of the necessary corrections in the content and methods of political work, and other questions.

On the basis of the experience generalized in the course of the practical scientific conference for the chiefs of the political bodies and the seminar which followed it for the deputy unit commanders for political affairs, a comprehensive approach in the indoctrination of the personnel began to be introduced more consistently and skillfully in the troops. The experience generalized by the political directorate in organizing oral propaganda as one of the methods for achieving a comprehensive approach in formation X was good help for the commanders and political workers in this work. In the material which described this experience, particular attention was given to the participation of the command personnel in propagandizing the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the decrees of the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the conclusions and theses in the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and to the influence of this work on ideological growth, military indoctrination and the moral maturing of the soldiers. Also useful was the album of visual aids prepared by the political directorate from the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and showing the content and principles of a comprehensive approach in indoctrination. The political directorate also published a series of leaflets on the leading officers who were masters in the training and indoctrination of the personnel, and on the best leaders of the officer Marxist-Leninist training groups and political exercises for the sergeants and soldiers. All of this helped to disseminate all that was new and promising which had been accumulated in the practice of indoctrinating personnel in our district.

Arming of the commanders, the political workers and the party leaders with experience in introducing the comprehensive approach and with knowledge of the scientific principles of political indoctrination is also aided by practical analysis of their work directly on the spot, by the personal participation of the officers from the political directorate and the political bodies of the formations in preparing various political indoctrination measures with the officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers. The political directorate has made a thorough analysis of the work in the area of training and indoctrinating the personnel in the signal units, the missile troops and artillery, air defense and rocket artillery weapons. The inspection was of a comprehensive nature. It encompassed all elements from the headquarters of the branches of troops and the service down to the company and battery, inclusively. In the course of it, an analysis was made of the quality of the exercises in the basic forms of political training, the organization of ideological-political work, the participation of the communist leaders in it, and the role of the party organizations in raising the effectiveness of the indoctrinational process.

The political directorate positively viewed the work of the party organization in the staff of the district missile troops and artillery. Its basic efforts were aimed at indoctrinating high responsibility in the communists for carrying out service and party duty, and creating a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective. The party organization has given constant attention to improving the style of work of the communists in the troops. Before each trip to the unit they are given party assignments related to participation in the indoctrination of personnel, and to providing help to the commanders, political workers and party activists in this work. One out of every two communists here is a member of an agitation propaganda group. Many comrades during the year have spoken 8-10 times in the troops giving lectures and reports. An example of this is the communist leaders Maj Gens Art S. Klyapin and V. Kostrov, Cols V. Krevskiy, V. Permitin and others. They themselves have mastered the methods of applying a comprehensive approach to indoctrination, and teach the skills of using it in the ideological work of the commanders, political workers and all officers.

The political directorate has recommended that the political bodies and party organizations systematically teach the art of employing the method of a comprehensive approach in ideological work the entire category of military personnel, from the leadership of the formations and units down to the commanders and political workers of the subunits. Certainly success in the matter, as our own experience has shown, depends upon to what degree its organizers and direct executors are trained. Here attention is focused on ensuring a unity of instruction and indoctrination, and raising the indoctrinational role of the exercises in military training, the tactical exercises and flights.

In working in the units, we give unflagging attention to supervising the implementation of these recommendations in order that they do not merely remain good intentions. And it must be said that this has produced results. The training of the officers has been well organized by the political

department where Officer Ye. Surtayev is one of the workers. Here not a single seminar for political workers or secretaries of the party and Komsomol organizations is held which did not analyze the practices of ideological work. The questions of a comprehensive approach in indoctrination are systematically studied with the company and platoon commanders. Seminars and theoretical colloquiums are held with them on such questions as: The practical work of the subunit commander in strengthening discipline, maintaining proper order and uniting the military collective; the methods of moral indoctrination of military personnel under modern conditions; the forms and methods of individual indoctrination; the reliance of the commander on the party and Komsomol organizations.

The very idea of comprehensiveness excludes the appearance of chance or drift. It requires a scientific approach, the clear coordinating of all elements, the planned and consistent attaining of the outlined goals, and the ability of the leaders to see far ahead, to consider the multiplicity of various aspects of army life and the indoctrinational role of the various measures. In a word, there must be systematic interrelated long-range and current planning of ideological work.

Well thought out planning makes it possible to coordinate all the available forces and means, to prevent duplication of the measures, and to ensure the continuous acquiring of the necessary knowledge and convictions by the persons being indoctrinated as well as the acquisition of valuable skills and qualities.

Each year the political directorate compiles a long-range plan which envisages the basic measures in party political work to improve combat readiness, the quality of military training, the organization of the socialist competition, and the ways for improving the ideological-political indoctrination of the personnel, strengthening military discipline and improving personnel work.

The long-range planning is concretized in the monthly plans as well as in the special plans for the fundamental problems and areas of training and indoctrinating the personnel.

Certainly, all these plans are closely tied to the programs for military training, commander training of the officers, and with the tasks which must be carried out by one or another collective.

For example, take the long-range plan for ideological work for this year of the political body where Officer V. Grebenyuk is the deputy chief. The plan envisages systematic and profound propagandizing of Lenin's ideological heritage, the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, the decisions of the party and the government, the new USSR Constitution, the reports and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, his books "Malaya Zemlya" [The Small Land] and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth], the military oath and the moral code of a builder of communism, the study of the work of the commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations in introducing the comprehensive

approach in indoctrination, the providing of concrete aid to the party aktiv on the spot, and so forth. The comprehensive plan also encompasses the ideological work of the garrison officer club, the museum and the rooms of military glory, the clubs and libraries of the units, the Lenin rooms of the subunits, the use of radio, television, periodicals and materials of visual agitation.

A significant portion of this plan has already been carried out. For example, many of its targets have been achieved related to strengthening and improving the physical plant for ideological work. In the officer club, the office of military pedagogics and psychology has been reequipped, procedural labs have been organized in the units for the independent work of the officers in improving their ideological and theoretical level, the visual agitation has been reworked devoted to the USSR Constitution, to the greetings of the CPSU Central Committee to the 18th Komsomol Congress, the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at it, and to his books "Malaya Zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye," and inspections have been carried out of the clubs, libraries, rooms of military glory, and the Lenin rooms of the subunits.

Each month at a meeting of the workers of the political bodies they analyze the course of carrying out the long-range plan, and in accord with the new tasks its individual provisions are adjusted and concretized. This is preceded by a thorough study of the state of affairs in the units.

Life shows that when such a plan is earnestly carried out, successes in the military collectives constantly rise. In this formation, there is an inseparable link between the excellently conducted exercises, the increase in the number of outstanding men and class specialists and the solving of problems outlined in the long-range plan. In other words, comprehensiveness in planning has helped to solve the questions of indoctrination comprehensively, and all of this has had a positive effect in the deeds of the personnel and in further raising combat readiness.

Unfortunately, instances are still encountered when a very full plan serves in essence only as a cover for passivity and idleness for individual leaders. We encountered precisely this phenomenon in the unit where the officer A. Naborshchikov serves. Here the plan contained good measures, the executors had been established, the needs of the various categories of servicemen had been considered, the forces and means had been allocated, and the days and hours given. But in actuality it turned out that the indoctrinational work was carried out haphazardly and without any analysis. They had overlooked the warrant officers and the soldiers in the last year of service, and the political exercises were conducted on a low level. And was this not the reason that in certain subunits an unhealthy moral attitude began to develop, and there were instances of improper relations between the servicemen and serious violations of discipline.

When the officers from the political directorate began to go into the reasons for the shortcomings committed here, it turned out, for example,

that WO A. Novikov and Pvt's L. Kul'baba and Yu. Petrovskiy who had committed serious violations of military discipline had rarely attended the measures of an indoctrinational nature, they had missed political exercises and in essence individual work had not been done with them. In the subunit lectures had been given on the oath and regulations, talks had been held on uniting the troop collective, and Soviet legislation had been explained. But the leaders had not analyzed who had attended these measures, and they did not "notice" that precisely those servicemen who had been inclined to deviate from the requirements of the regulations and from the moral norms had been overlooked.

As one can see, the tasks of a comprehensive approach to indoctrinating the personnel in essence were poorly carried out. At times here only the indoctrinated were indoctrinated and the convinced were convinced. The ideological and political influence was focused on the collective "as a whole" at a certain "average" person, without considering the particular features of the different categories of servicemen and their personal qualities. As for individual work, it was most often organized as an "over-response." If a soldier committed an infraction they then tried to make up for all that had been overlooked in his indoctrination. But what had already been done was not corrected and not changed.

This is why we would like to stress that with all the importance and significance of planning, the main criterion in our work is its effectiveness and quality, the specific results of the applied efforts manifested in the real indicators of military and political training, in the level of discipline and combat readiness.

As is known, the basic and all-round tempering of the personnel develops in the course of active military and political training, in the process of exercises, training and studies as close as possible to actual combat. And this is understandable. Intensive training accompanied by the surmounting of a number of difficulties requires the greatest mobilization of the moral and physical forces of the men. Moreover, under conditions which are close to combat reality, the very methods of indoctrination are tested out, improved and enriched, and experience is acquired which can be applied in real combat.

In this sense the tactical exercise conducted in the Iron Division last winter was good schooling for the commanders, political workers and party activists. During this the experience of the Carpathian Exercises was widely used and significantly generalized.

This time the men had to cross a water barrier in the cold season, to advance behind a moving barrage and carry out a number of other complex and new missions for the personnel. Chief attention was focused on developing high moral-psychological and military qualities in the men. As before, various forms were used for this. Meetings were held with frontline soldiers who under the most difficult conditions of a war had crossed large and small water obstacles. Inestimable benefit came from a meeting

between the motorized rifle and artillery troops who were to carry out the mission of close coordination. Clearly planned and efficient work was carried out with all categories of the personnel including with the young officers, warrant officers, sergeants, the soldiers in the last and first year of service, with engineers and technicians. The notion was dissipated which had still been adhered to by some that individual categories of officers were impartial to the carrying out of ideological and political work. At the party meeting which preceded the exercise, it was stated unambiguously that such a position on the part of individual officers did harm to the indoctrination of the men, for the objective conditions of combat training and the life of the troops demanded an active involvement by all officers in shaping the ideology of the men. Here the communist leaders set the example. The division commander Maj Gen I. Rodionov, workers from the political department, communists from the staff, and members from the agitation and propaganda collective and the agitation and propaganda groups spoke to the soldiers. In the companies and batteries where there were no political workers, non-T/O deputy commanders for political affairs were appointed from the party members. They were carefully instructed and successfully carried out their tasks.

In the entire complex of means of ideological influence on the participants in the exercise, an important place was held by the socialist competition. Many factors contributed to strengthening its indoctrinational role. Among them was the skillful use of moral incentives. After each stage of the exercise, in the subunits the winners of the competition were announced among each category of specialists. For commending them use was made of pennants, certificates, stars applied to the tank turrets or the sides of the infantry combat vehicles, honor ribbons, letters of thanks, express leaflets, and announcements over the local radio and in the large-circulation newspapers.

The exercises mentioned here fully attained their aims.

In speaking of the ability to utilize the entire arsenal of forms in ideological work, as one of the requirements in the comprehensive approach to indoctrination, we must not forget the necessity of not just the simple but rather the discriminating use of these forms. It is important to turn above all to those which can solve one or another problem most effectively and with the highest quality. I will give an example.

The personnel of one of the units was to operate as part of a tactical airborne force. Prior to this the soldiers had never made a landing, and some felt uncertain and even voiced doubts as to the capabilities of the helicopter equipment. The focus of the work was suggested by the very situation. But then the question arose of selecting the means. Initially it was proposed that a political information session be held on the combat cooperation of the various branches of troops. However, having discussed this question with the party activists, the political worker took a different decision. It was essential that the motorized rifle troops meet ahead of time with the aviators, and become familiar with the equipment on

which they were to make the landing. Certainly the adage is right that it is better to see something once than to hear it a hundred times. And this is what they did. The party committee organized a meeting of the personnel with the squadron commander Maj V. Murav'yev who described to the motorized rifle troops the remarkable qualities of Soviet helicopters and familiarized the soldiers and sergeants with the equipment. Then a test flight was held. On the following day, Capt G. Goroshenko spoke to the men, who was to work with the airborne party. The communists held talks on "From the Sky Into Battle" and "Particular Features of the Actions of Troops in a Tactical Airborne Landing." After meeting with the flyers, these talks were received with particular comprehension. The motorized rifle troops gained respect and confidence in their military comrades, the flyers, who had given wings to the infantry. And in the exercises they acted boldly, resourcefully and smoothly. All of this affirmed the correctness of the choice of the means and the sequence of employing them in accord with the principles of solving political indoctrination problems.

A comprehensive solution to indoctrination problems presupposes a continuous improvement in the forms of this work. And this includes those which have been employed for many decades. For example, take individual work. For instance it is often felt that the holding of a talk is a simple matter. But if you listen to a certain comrade and you see that his talk is very far from that earnest and moving form in which it should be carried out. Individual lectures and reports also suffer from crucial shortcomings. A dry exposition of the material, for the absence of clear impressive facts frequently make a speech uninteresting, uninformative and dull. We feel that good advice can be found in the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev which he voiced from the rostrum of the 18th Komsomol Congress: "The time has come for all the workers on the ideological front to put an end to the still encountered practice of the mechanical, rote repetition of common truths and verbal babble. The time has come to make it a rule to speak with people in a simple and understandable language, and to write investing a lively thought and feelings into each phrase. This also is a question of quality and effectiveness, and in such an important area of building communism as the indoctrination of a new man."

In conclusion it must be said that the political directorate is concerned for making the commanders, the political workers and the party activists penetrate deeply into the essence of the comprehensive approach, understand its fine points and grasp what new features are being introduced into ideological work by this method and what qualitative shifts can occur in the units and subunits as a result of employing it. However, it would be wrong to overlook what is still, as they say, beyond our grasp and where we have not succeeded. As yet we have not been able to make the company, the battery and the squadron the center of applying all indoctrinational efforts. In a number of troop collectives they still have not found an optimum balance between the mass forms and individual indoctrination work. At times the quantitative indicators are shifted to the forefront and attention is lessened on quality and on the content of mass political measures.

In some places they are divorced from the tasks being carried out by the collective.

We are aware of our shortcomings and we are endeavoring, as has been indicated to us by the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, to subordinate all the content of ideological and indoctrinational work to having each Soviet soldier see the sense and aim of his life in the wholehearted service of the motherland and the conscientious fulfillment of his military duty. In a word, it is a question of the effectiveness of indoctrination where the measure of this is the specific deeds.

And our deeds are this. The men of the district have successfully concluded the winter combat training. There has been a noticeable increase in the ranks of outstanding men in military and political training as well as class specialists. At present, when summer combat training is in full swing, the Carpathian troops, in equaling the right flankers of the socialist competition, constantly follow the demand posed by our party for our people: "Work better today than yesterday, and tomorrow better than today." And in carrying out this task, we feel it would be difficult to overestimate the role of a comprehensive approach to indoctrination as this will make it possible to activate many reserves residing in the people themselves.

We consider it our duty and our party obligation to put these reserves to further raising combat readiness.

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INDOCTRINATION ON INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF ARMED FORCES OUTLINED

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[Article by Capt 1st Rank Yu. Osipov, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent: "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the International Nature of Defending the Victories of Socialism"]

[Text] Eight hours are allocated for studying the subject. It is advisable to allocate this time in the following manner: 2 hours for a lecture (narration), 2 hours for the independent preparation of the students and 4 hours for a seminar (talk).

In the lecture (narration) it is advisable to answer the following questions: 1. V. I. Lenin on internationalism and its role in defending the victories of socialism. 2. The liberation mission of the Soviet Army during the years of World War II. 3. The Warsaw Pact--a military-political alliance of the nations of the socialist commonwealth.

In a short speech the leader of the exercises should note that the Great October Socialist Revolution opened up a new age in world history. It brought freedom and political equality to all the peoples of Russia, it freed them from social and national suppression, and it created all the conditions for strengthening and developing the alliance of the working class and all the workers of our socialist motherland with the international proletariat. "One of the noteworthy features of the October Revolution," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "was the proletarian internationalism which tied the workers of Russia by firm ties with their class brothers throughout the world. With full justification it can be said that the victory of October was a victory of the international fraternity of workers and a victory of proletarian internationalism" ("Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 2, p 81).

Proletarian internationalism is one of the main principles in the ideology and policy of the working class, the Marxist-Leninist parties, and a most important principle in the activities of communists. It permeates the entire content of the theory and practice of scientific communism. Proletarian internationalism is expressed in the solidarity of the working

class, its communist vanguard, and the workers of all nations, in the unity and coordination of their actions, their help to one another, mutual support in the struggle against international capital for democracy and socialism. The specific content of proletarian internationalism is enriched in the process of developing the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the victory of socialist revolutions, and in the course of building socialism and communism.

Prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution proletarian internationalism meant the international solidarity of the workers for the purpose of overthrowing capitalism and winning state power. After the victory of Great October, it found its expression also in support for the world's first socialist state by the international proletariat and in the support of the USSR for the world workers and national-liberation movement. After the victory of socialist revolutions in a number of nations and the formation of the world socialist system, one of the most important principles of proletarian internationalism has been, in addition, the strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the socialist nations, and the establishing of truly fraternal relations between them. Loyalty to proletarian, socialist internationalism, fraternal cooperation between the socialist nations and the all-round development of ties between them are one of the decisive conditions for the successful development of the entire international communist movement which represents the vanguard of all the antiimperialist forces of the modern world.

In speaking at the 18th Komsomol Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet people who have grown into a fraternal family of peoples, in being indoctrinated in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, by their very nature are internationalists. Internationalist traditions are presently embodied in their deeds probably more widely and more diversely than ever before." He further stressed: "Proletarian, socialist internationalism is our great strength. It is the fruit of our convictions and the ardor of our hearts. It is our banner."

In recent years the ideas of proletarian internationalism, like all Marxist-Leninist teachings as a whole, have been further developed and enriched in the decisions of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and in the speeches of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

1. V. I. Lenin on Internationalism, Its Role in Defending the Victories of Socialism

In the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of the world, for eliminating the system of wage slavery and exploitation of man by man, the workers, regardless of their nationality, have a single common class enemy, the world bourgeoisie and imperialism. "Capital," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "is an international force. In order to vanquish it there must be an international alliance of the workers, an international fraternity of them" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 40, p 43).

The great leader foresaw that the imperialist bourgeoisie would endeavor to unite its forces in order to eliminate by common effort the victories of a socialist revolution wherever it occurred. He pointed out that the imperialists would not limit themselves to using just economic, political and ideological means for weakening the new social system, but would rather endeavor to utilize the force of arms. For this reason, the socialist revolution should be able to oppose the class enemy armed to the teeth with an invincible military might.

Lenin considered the defense of the victories of socialism as the highest international duty not only for the workers of that nation in which the proletarian revolution had been victorious and in which a new social system existed, but also for the entire international proletariat.

V. I. Lenin considered that for a true internationalist, the fates of the revolution in his own nation and the development of the revolutionary process in all nations were equally dear. "Internationalism in deed," he wrote, "is just one thing: wholehearted work on developing the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's nation, support (by propaganda, sympathy or materially) for such a struggle, for such a line, and for only it, in all nations without exception" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 31, p 170).

The leader of the revolution angrily branded those pseudorevolutionaries who merely held forth on internationalism, and for whom internationalism "remained something like a shibboleth or a holiday stroll through the gardens of internationalistic verbosity" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 26, p 199). He demanded a true, constant and effective struggle to carry out the political slogans of internationalism, emphasizing that "internationalism consists not in phrases, not in an expression of solidarity, not in resolutions, but in deeds" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 34, p 280).

Loyal to its international duty and to the legacy of V. I. Lenin, the USSR has always and is providing effective economic, political and other aid to the revolutionary forces of the modern world in their just struggle for social and national liberation.

The 60-year history of our socialist motherland is the history of the rise of unshakable unity and friendship among all the peoples brought together within the Soviet socialist state. This is the history of the economic, political and cultural flourishing of all the nations and nationalities inhabiting our country. Great October was a true school of proletarian internationalism. The revolution developed under the slogan of the universal liberation of the workers in our multinational nation.

The Russian proletariat, in freeing itself from capitalist slavery, played the crucial role also in the liberation of all the peoples of our country. The October Revolution meant the establishing of fraternal cooperation among the workers of all nationalities..

As V. I. Lenin foresaw, the downfall of the old work, the breaking up of the exploiting system, and the birth of the world's socialist state were accompanied by a fierce class struggle which developed into a civil war. The forces of the internal counterrevolution and world imperialism descended on the Soviet country. The major capitalist nations of Europe as well as the United States and Japan participated in the intervention. The working class resisted the unified counterrevolution by the great force of proletarian solidarity which was engendered by the revolution. In the central regions of the nation, in the steppes of the Ukraine and the Volga, in the Don and the Kuban', by the White Sea and in the mountains of the Caucasus, in the sands of Central Asia and in the distant Amur area, the sons of all the peoples of our fatherland fought shoulder to shoulder against the enemy under the banner of the Red Army. They went together into battle for peace, bread and land, and for Soviet power. During the years of the Civil War, as during the unforgettable days of Great October, the international solidarity of the working class and of the entire working people was one of the important sources of our victory.

During the first stage the development of a new socialist type of army was carried out within the individual Union republics. But the necessity of defending the victories of the revolution required the joining of military forces and centralized leadership over them. Lenin pointed out: "...In standing against the enormous front of the imperialist powers, we who are fighting against imperialism represent an alliance which requires close military solidarity, and any attempts to destroy this solidarity is viewed by us as a completely inadmissible phenomenon, and as betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism. ...We say: a unity of military forces is essential, and a deviation from this unity is inadmissible" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 40, pp 98-99).

On 1 June 1919, in Moscow, a ceremony of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] was held, and this was attended by the representatives of all the Union republics. The VTsIK approved a decision on the conclusion of a military alliance of the peoples of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia and Lithuania, and on establishing a joint military command. From the very first steps of their history, the Soviet Armed Forces became truly international. By the end of the Civil War there were representatives of almost 50 nationalities in the Red Army. Among them the Russian represented 77.6 percent, 13.7 Ukrainians, 4 percent Belorussians, and 4.7 percent were Latvians, Tatars, Bashkirs and representatives of other nationalities.

In showing unprecedented courage and heroism, the Soviet soldiers defeated the unified forces of the counterrevolution, and drove the interventionists out of our country. In the fire of the Civil War a political, economic and military union was forged and strengthened among all the nations and nationalities of our country, and this was the real embodiment of the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism.

Great October was a school of internationalism not only for the peoples of Russia but also for millions of proletarians and workers in the foreign

nations. It caused an unprecedented upsurge in the movement of international solidarity of the international proletariat. "Hands Off Soviet Russia!"--under this slogan the workers of many nations of the world came to the defense of the young socialist republic protecting it against the imperialist predators. Thousands of representatives of the working class, the peasantry and intelligentsia of the foreign nations courageously fought in the ranks of the fighters for the cause of our revolution.

Upon the advice and with the support of V. I. Lenin, in Petrograd in February 1918, an international detachment was organized as part of the I Corps of the Red Army. By the summer of 1918, international units had been formed in several score cities of the Soviet republic including Moscow, Petrograd, Tver', Voronezh, Penza, Kazan', Tsaritsyn, Orenburg, Irkutsk and so forth.

The creation of international military formations was of important significance for defending the young Soviet nation. In a number of speeches to the troops of the Red Army, V. I. Lenin said that with the victory of the October Revolution in actuality an alliance had been achieved between the revolutionaries of different nations, and that the overcoming of national hostility and mistrust was the guarantee of victory. He warmly welcomed the international workers from other countries who had helped the workers of our nation defend the victories of the socialist revolution. In a speech at a meeting of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment in August 1918, Lenin said: "On you has befallen the great honor of defending sacred ideas with weapons in hand and...in actuality to carry out the international fraternity of peoples" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 37, p 26).

The international nature of the Soviet Armed Forces was visibly apparent also in the support of the revolutionary liberation struggle of other peoples to eliminate social and national suppression. Thus, in 1921, the Red Army provided help to the Mongolian people, having defeated the White Guard bands of Ungern and the troops of foreign invaders. In 1939, the Red Army, along with units of the Mongolian People's Army, routed the Japanese militarists in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River. In 1923-1927, the USSR provided help to China in organizing the People's Revolutionary Army, in sending volunteers and military advisers there. The leading military adviser in China was the outstanding Soviet military leader V. K. Blyukher. In 1937-1939, the USSR again provided fraternal aid to the Chinese people in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. In 1939, Soviet troops carried out their international duty in a liberation campaign into the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, and in 1940 provided fraternal aid to the workers of the Baltic republics. By their presence they did not permit the suppression of proletarian revolutions in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Our nation provided direct military aid to the Spanish Republic in 1936-1939, when Hitler Germany and Fascist Italy organized an intervention against it in the aim of supporting the Fascist rebels. In Spain Soviet

volunteers fought in the international brigades in the ranks of the republican army and covered themselves with undying glory.

Thus, it can be concluded that proletarian internationalism is a glorious tradition of the international working class and its vanguard, the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. It has been tempered in the fire of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War, and has gained further development in the subsequent years. The vital force of proletarian internationalism was particularly apparent during the period of World War II.

2. The Liberation Mission of the Soviet Army During the Years of World War II

The treacherous attack of fascist Germany interrupted the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. In a long and the most severe of the wars in the history of our motherland, the Soviet people carried out a feat the equal of which has never been known by mankind. The Soviet people not only were able to defend their liberty and independence, but also made a decisive contribution to the cause of rescuing European and world civilization from destruction by fascist barbarians. The Soviet soldier showed the entire world that not only was the fate of his own homeland dear to him, but also the fate of the workers of the entire world, that he was always ready to devote all his forces and, if need be, his life in the struggle for the interests of the workers, for democracy and socialism, and against imperialist aggression and plunder.

The historic feat of the Soviet people during the years of the Great Patriotic War cost them, as is known, more than 20 million lives. And it made this sacrifice on the altar of peace, humanism and social progress. "For decades the imperialists slandered our party," wrote Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the book "Malaya Zemlya" [The Little Land], "for decades they forced into the heads of people monstrous absurdities on our life and our people. And then the Soviet man arrived in Europe as a liberator. It was important in no way not to defame this high humane mission, and our soldiers did not defame it. Everywhere they were seen as self-sacrificing, full of nobility, humane and just, and war-seared."

The loyalty to the spirit of proletarian internationalism and class solidarity was embodied in the help of our state to the peoples who rose to fight against German fascism, in the broad support to the Resistance which developed in the fascist-occupied nations of Europe. The working class headed by the communist and workers parties was the soul and core of this movement. In the USSR worked foreign bureaus of a number of fraternal parties headed by prominent leaders of the international communist and workers movement. They helped the patriots of their nations develop a political and armed struggle in the enemy rear. Due to the organizing and directing activity of the communist and workers parties, the Resistance to the Nazi invaders encompassed all the European nations.

The peoples of the USSR made a particularly great contribution to the struggle of the peoples for liberation from fascism. The outstanding victories of the Soviet Armed Forces at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk had a strong impact on increasing the antifascist struggle in Europe.

The bourgeois falsifiers of history have proposed a version of the supposed "exporting of revolution" by the USSR to the countries of Central and Southeast Europe and the imposing of "Soviet regimes" on them. But this is an evil distortion of historical truth. The exporting of revolution is fundamentally contradictory to the objective laws of social development and to the laws of the class struggle. V. I. Lenin pointed out: "A revolution is not made by order, it is not timed to one or another moment, but rather matures in the process of historical development and breaks out at a moment caused by a complex of an entire series of internal and external factors" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 36, p 531).

The people's revolutions in the nations liberated by the Soviet Army had been prepared for by their internal development. The liberation struggle which had developed during the years of the war was focused not only against the fascist occupiers, but also against the reactionary regimes which had brought these nations to national catastrophe and to a loss of independence. The defeat of the Nazi war machine by the USSR created favorable external conditions for a victory of the national revolutionary forces. The might of the victorious Soviet Army and the increased international authority of the USSR excluded the possibility of intervention by the imperialist powers in the nations where a revolutionary situation had been created, and thwarted the forces of domestic reaction. But the liberated peoples themselves chose the new socioeconomic system and created a corresponding political system for society. Where the internal conditions did not exist for a reorganization of social life, their revolutions did not occur regardless of the presence of Soviet troops. This was the case, for example, in Austria, Norway and Denmark, although Soviet military troops and formations remained there for an extended time (sometimes up to several years).

The peoples of the nations liberated by the USSR Armed Forces themselves determined their fate, and many of them ultimately came through a People's Democracy to socialism. This is the historical truth. The rise of socialist states was a natural result of social development and the outcome of an extended and difficult struggle by the international working class for its social and national liberation.

With the decisive aid of the USSR during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the foundations were established for modern socialist armies in the form of armed formations of a new type, and the international military fraternity of the future armed forces of the socialist nations was forged. For the first time in history, the working class and the working masses in the nonsocialist nations gained an opportunity to create armed national formations on the territory of a socialist state for fighting for their liberation.

The total number of foreign troops organized on USSR territory reached 555,000 persons. Several billion rubles were spent on their expenses. Prior to May 1945, the Soviet state had supplied them with around 960,000 rifles, carbines and automatics, 16,502 guns and mortars, 40,627 machine-guns, 1,124 tanks and assault guns, 2,346 aircraft and much other military equipment.

The first foreign military unit organized in our nation was the Czechoslovak battalion under the command of Col Ludvik Svoboda who subsequently became the president of the CSSR and a prominent leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The battalion was armed with the best examples of Soviet weapons, and in March 1943, was already fighting along with our troops against the Nazis near the village of Sokolovo near Khar'kov, showing courage and heroism. The Soviet command had high praise for the feat of our brothers in arms, having awarded orders and medals to 84 Czechoslovak officers, while the commander of the first company Sr Lt Otakar Jaros became the first foreign soldier to receive the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In receiving the Order of Lenin at that time, Ludvik Svoboda said: "I promise you that in future battles each of us will do everything to be worthy of that honor and affection which the Soviet people have shown us. The blood of our fallen and wounded soldiers has strengthened the old friendship of our peoples. By unstinting combat and shoulder to shoulder with the glorious Red Army we want to win for our people the support and backing of your nation for all times."

In May 1943, the first Czechoslovak brigade was organized and this became part of the troops of the First Ukrainian Front which liberated the capital of the Ukraine, Kiev. The battles for the Dnepr and Kiev were a true school of internationalism. A participant in the battle for Kiev, the Czechoslovak officer Berdzhik Rainits wrote at that time in the newspaper PRAVDA: "The fraternity in arms strengthened by blood from the very first joint battles of our units no longer knows the differences between the gray coat of the Red Armyman and the green of the Czechoslovak. Lying side by side were the Soviet infantrymen and the Czechoslovak submachinegunner. The Russian senior lieutenant took over the machinegun from the wounded Slovak soldier Kopicek. A minute later he also fell. But his blood mixed with the blood of our soldiers. But the Germans did not advance a single step. Their counterattack was stopped, and our infantry--Soviet and Czechoslovak--moved forward."

The Soviet command had high praise for the actions of the Czechoslovak brigade in the battles for the liberation of Kiev, having awarded it the Order of Suvorov. Lt A. Sohor and Sr Lt R. Tesarzik were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Some 139 Czechoslovak soldiers received orders and medals.

In May 1943, near Ryazan', the formation of the First Polish Division named after the Polish national hero Tadeusz Kosciuszko began to be formed.

Subsequently, upon the request of Polish patriots, a decision was approved to form the I Polish Corps and later this grew into the First Polish Army.

The First Polish Division imeni T. Kosciusko, numbering over 11,000 soldiers and officers, received its baptism in fire at Lenino in Mogilevskaya Oblast. Here the fighting association of Polish and Soviet soldiers received its christening in blood. In recalling this battle, the Polish officer W. Zalewsky has written: "From all sides cries of 'hur-rah!' reached us. Even the wounded thought of new battles. I remember the cup of hot tea drunk at a Soviet battery. I remember how we were surrounded by Soviet friends and embraced, kissed and congratulated...." Some 242 of the most outstanding Polish soldiers received Soviet orders and medals.

In pointing out the significance of military international solidarity during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR Minister of Defense and Mar SU D. F. Ustinov in a report at a ceremony dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy said: "Along with the Soviet Army, the formations and armies of Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the patriots of Romania, Bulgaria and Albania fought courageously against the fascist invaders. The troops of fraternal Mongolia also took an active part in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army.

"Today, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, we send them our military greeting. We are confident that the blood shed in the common battle and the losses and hardships of wartime suffered together and the common joy of victory over fascism have not been forgotten and never will be forgotten."

The glory of our Armed Forces won at a dear price in the battles against the enemy will never die. It was they who were the first to stop the strongest army in the capitalist world, that of fascist Germany, and they blocked the path to the further spread of aggression. It was they who destroyed the basic forces of the Nazi hordes and who made a crushing strike against Japanese militarists. It was they who liberated many peoples of Europe and Asia from foreign enslavement, and who worthily fulfilled their great international mission.

Thus, the entire history of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces and the struggle of all the nations and nationalities of our country for defending their socialist fatherland serve as visible proof that the Soviet people are an internationalist people by birth, spirit and by way of action. They will never forget that they have been helped in opening up a new age in history, in starting the construction of a society of social justice and in becoming a new historic community of people not only by their own decisiveness and revolutionary will, but also by the struggle of the internationalist revolutionaries of the entire world.

3. The Warsaw Pact--A Military Political Alliance of the Nations in the Socialist Commonwealth

In May 1955, the fraternal nations formed a defensive alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Its membership presently includes Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and the CSSR. The creation of this alliance was a response by the European socialist nations to the actions of the imperialist powers which with the most active participation of the United States in 1949 had concluded the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and begun an unprecedented arms race and assumed a policy of preparing for war against the USSR and the other socialist nations. All of this required unceasing concern from the CPSU and all the fraternal parties for raising the defense capability of the nations in the socialist commonwealth and their close and all-round cooperation.

The Warsaw Pact is a vivid embodiment of Lenin's ideas on proletarian internationalism, on the unity and solidarity of the countries of the victorious proletariat in defending the victories of socialism and in the struggle against the aggressive imperialist forces and world reaction.

The Warsaw Pact is a voluntary alliance of equal and sovereign states. Based upon principles of full equality, mutual respect, independence and sovereignty of the members, and noninterference into their internal affairs, the alliance of fraternal socialist countries is permeated with a spirit of friendship and cooperation, mutual confidence and comradely mutual aid.

The superior body of the Warsaw Pact is the Political Consultative Committee. Its activities are organized on the principle of equal rights and sovereignty of all the Pact members. It elaborates the strategy and tactics in the struggle for the security of the socialist countries, it takes decisions on international questions, and reviews important tasks related to strengthening the defenses of the socialist commonwealth and the carrying out of obligations by the member nations for joint defense of revolutionary victories.

Participating in the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee which are convened as necessary are, as a rule, the leaders of the communist and workers parties and the heads of states of the Warsaw Pact members. Many initiatives which the Political Consultative Committee has made, as was noted in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, underlay the decisions of major international forums, for example, the European Security and Cooperation Conference, or have been reflected in a number of bilateral international acts.

An important initiative was the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Members "For New Advances in International Detente, for Strengthening Security and the Development of Cooperation in Europe" approved at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee held in Bucharest on 25-26 November 1976. At this conference, in the aim of further improving the mechanism of political cooperation within the Pact a decision was taken to set up a Foreign Ministers Committee and a Joint Secretariat as bodies of the Political Consultative Committee. On 25-26 May 1977, the Foreign Ministers Committee held

its first meeting in Moscow. In April 1978, a similar meeting was held in Sofia.

At present, cooperation is continuing to deepen among the fraternal states in all areas of life. The communist and workers parties are the directing and organizing force of cooperation. The urgent questions of mutual relations are reviewed in the course of visits by party and governmental delegations and at meetings of the general and first secretaries of the central committees and other party and government leaders.

The economic basis of the Warsaw Pact is the unified socialist method of production, the absence of exploitation, and all-round economic and scientific-technical cooperation on principles of complete equality and a unity of goals in the construction of socialism and communism. In recent years the economic potential of the fraternal socialist states have become significantly strengthened, and the pace of scientific and technical progress has risen. The efficiency of the social economy has grown. The prosperity of the population has increased.

The nations of the socialist commonwealth are successfully coordinating their activities in the area of economic development by CEMA. Formed in 1949, CEMA has become today an enormous unified economic complex. During the years of its existence, the CEMA members have achieved unprecedented growth in industrial production and national income. The Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration is being carried out. The socialist division of labor, broad production cooperation and the long-term specific programs broaden the opportunities for the rational utilization of the raw material, energy and labor resources of the states of the community, and they make it possible to more fully utilize the advantages of the socialist economic system.

The share of the CEMA nations in world industrial production is presently about one-third. They produce over 2-fold more industrial product than the capitalist nations presently comprising the Common Market. The reciprocal deliveries between the CEMA nations are continuously growing.

It might be recalled that the fraternal nations are carrying out unprecedented cooperation in the area of the conquering of space and the use of it for peaceful purposes. They are conducting extensive research on the universe within the Intercosmos Program. A flight has been made by the first Soviet-Czechoslovak team of A. Gubarev and V. Remek, and new launches by cosmonauts from the fraternal nations are to come.

It is wise to point out that the CEMA states are providing economic aid to 75 developing nations. They have granted them long-term credits totaling on the order of 15 billion rubles. With CEMA assistance over 3,000 industrial enterprises and other projects have been built and are being built in these countries.

The USSR and the other socialist states are providing all-round support to the developing nations in their struggle to achieve their legitimate aspirations, for complete escape from imperialist exploitation and for the right to be the masters of their own fate. And this is also a manifestation of internationalism, of the fraternal solidarity of the socialist world with all the progressive forces of our planet.

Of particular significance is the cooperation of the fraternal parties and nations in the area of ideology. The ideological basis of the Warsaw Pact is the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and loyalty to the ideals of socialism and communism, the principles of socialist internationalism and class solidarity. "The general line of the communists on ideological questions," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is in essence a common line. And the strengthening of ideological unity, the consistent observation of Leninist principles in the struggle against any deviation from Marxism-Leninism and from socialist internationalism are, we are convinced, our common permanent duty and our obligation to the workers of the socialist nations and to the world working class" ("Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 5, pp 113-114).

The imperialists in the struggle against the forces of peace, democracy and socialism have no aversion to using the dirtiest strategies of "psychological warfare." Ideological subversion, provocations, slander, lies and blackmail--these are the arsenal of means which are used by imperialist propaganda. An example of this is the storm raised in the West over the question of the violation of human rights which supposedly has occurred in the socialist countries. The cynicism of this campaign which at the same time represents a flagrant interference into our internal affairs consists in the fact that acting in the role of the defenders of human rights are those who in no way support these rights in their own nations. And the accused are those states where man for the first time in history has actually benefited from the entire fullness of political, socioeconomic and personal rights and liberties.

The purpose of these and other ideological subversions by imperialism is to shatter the spiritual foundations of our peoples and if possible to drive a wedge between them, to erode socialism and undermine it from within. This is why the ideological clash is a constantly active front running through the hearts and minds of the people and influencing their ideology, views, feelings and mood. There can be no truce on this front. And the world of socialism is on the offensive on it.

In the political area, socialist internationalism consists in the consistent carrying out of a uniform political line by the fraternal countries and by the communist and workers parties. This line conforms to the fundamental interests of the peoples in the nations of the socialist commonwealth and to the progressive development of mankind. The political basis of our international union is the uniformity of the social and state system, the common class interests in building socialism and communism and in defending revolutionary victories, and the unified aims in the struggle for peace and social progress.

In assessing the situation in the world and the trends of world development, the 25th CPSU Congress emphasized: "The development of the socialist nations, the growth of their might and the strengthening of the beneficial influence of the international policy carried out by them--this presently comprises the main direction in social progress of mankind" ("Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 27).

The socialist commonwealth has become a natural center for uniting all the revolutionary forces of modern times. As a higher achievement of the international working class, it embodies the advanced method of production, and is the main force opposing imperialism, a bulwark of peace and the basis of the entire world revolutionary process. From it derive the material, political, diplomatic, military and moral aid and support for all the revolutionary forces.

For this reason, the basic thing in the foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet government is the struggle to strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist commonwealth, and to strengthen its influence on world development. The main thing on which the USSR and the fraternal countries of socialism are presently focusing their efforts is to ultimately eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, and to see to it that the favorable changes in international relations become permanent, to strengthen detente and to halt the arms race.

However in the capitalist world there are forces of reaction and aggression which are actively against detente and disarmament. These forces support areas of tension, they provoke military conflicts, and foster the arms race which is becoming evermore dangerous. Over the last 10 years alone, the nations comprising the aggressive NATO bloc have spent 1.3 trillion dollars on military preparations. Almost one-half of these colossal amounts has been in the last 4 years. Only last year, in 1977, the military outlays of the NATO nations were 165 billion dollars. And even higher allocations are planned for subsequent years.

The Chinese leaders are acting together with the world reaction. They in every possible way are endeavoring to fan hostility and hate between peoples, they conduct malicious propaganda against the USSR and the other fraternal nations and are calling for the creation of a united anti-Soviet front.

Quite understandably the USSR and all the nations of the socialist commonwealth cannot disregard the military preparations and intrigues of the aggressive forces, regardless where they are carried out. Our peoples have paid a very high price for peace. And for us there is no more important task than to ensure the security of the motherland and the victories of socialism.

The CPSU has constantly followed the Leninist thesis that a revolution can strengthen its victory only in the instance that it is able to defend itself. Life has shown the necessity and vital importance of close military cooperation between the fraternal nations in the interests of their collective defense.

The might and invincibility of the military community of the socialist Warsaw Pact nations have honorably withstood testing in a number of acute international conflicts when the victories of socialism were threatened. In 1956, the USSR provided effective aid to the fraternal Hungarian people in defeating the counterrevolution supported by the forces of imperialist reaction. In 1961, the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Pact prevented a military intervention being prepared against the GDR, having forced imperialist reaction to retreat. In 1962, the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries came decisively to the defense of revolutionary Cuba. In August 1968, the collective actions of the fraternal socialist nations helped the peoples of Czechoslovakia to defend socialist victories against the encroachments of counterrevolutionary forces and subversion by external enemies. For many years the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth divided all-round aid to the heroic Vietnamese people in their struggle against American imperialism. By joint efforts of the Warsaw Pact nations, such a defense potential has been created and is maintained that any attempt by imperialism to settle scores with socialism by military force is doomed ahead of time to a crushing defeat.

The Defense Ministers Committee established in 1969 is concerned with elaborating coordinated recommendations and proposals for strengthening the defense capability of the Warsaw Pact states. The activities of the Military Council, the Joint Command, the Staff and the Technical Committee of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states are constantly being improved. The commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces since January 1977 has been Mar SU V. G. Kulikov, and Gen Arm A. I. Gribkov has been the chief of staff since October 1976.

The military cooperation of the fraternal states is many-sided. It includes the coordinating of defensive measures, the plans for the organizational development of the national armies and the increasing of their combat readiness. It presupposes mutual aid in the technical equipping of the troops and naval forces, in the development and use of new weapons and military equipment, and in the training of military and military-scientific personnel. It means a pooling of efforts in the development of military theory, as well as the elaboration and introduction of common principles of the training and indoctrination of personnel.

An important form of military cooperation among the allied armies is the joint exercises conducted under the plans of the Joint Command. They help to achieve unity of views on the questions of military art, and they aid in improving the organization of interaction and control of the allied troops, the raising of the skills of the commanders and staffs, as well as the military skills of all the personnel. At the same time, these exercises represent a good school for international indoctrination of the personnel.

In 1977 the major joint exercise Union-77 was conducted. This exercise carried out under the motto "To Worthily Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of Great October," showed the increased training level of the troops and

was a good school for the international indoctrination of the men and for strengthening their military cooperation.

There has been a systematic exchange of experience in party political work on indoctrination of the personnel in a spirit of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the training of ideologically convinced, steadfast and tempered soldiers who are patriots and internationalists. The political bodies in our groups of forces have acquired great experience in the international indoctrination of the personnel. For example, the closest ties have been established between the men of the Guards Volnovakh Motorized Rifle Regiment (Southern Group of Forces) and the men of the Hungarian People's Army and the local population. Strong friendship links the guardsmen with the Red Cepel workers who have been the initiators of the competition in Hungary to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of Great October. There is much that is interesting and instructive in the area of the international indoctrination of the personnel and the strengthening of the ties of friendship and fraternity with the GDR soldiers and workers in the activities of the commander and party organization of the Guards Chertkov Tank Regiment (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany). Many similar examples could be given.

The operational and tactical courses, meetings of military chiefs, political workers, military scientific conferences and the exchange of military delegations are a good means of reciprocal exchange of experience acquired by the allied armies in training and political indoctrination. Of great significance are the broad contacts and ties between the military scientists of our nations, the workers of the military press, artistic figures and athletes. Leadership by the communist and workers parties, their unity and solidarity are a most important source of strength and might for the military-political alliance of the fraternal socialist nations. In emphasizing this notion at the 25th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that the basic foundation of our close cooperation, its vital soul and directing, organizing force is the unshakable militant alliance of the communist parties of the socialist nations, the unity of their ideology, the unity of goals and the unity of will.

The close military cooperation among the Warsaw Pact states has already made a worthy contribution to strengthening the defense might of the socialist commonwealth. It will develop and be improved in the future. "We," emphasized the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, "are decisive opponents both to splitting the world into opposing military blocs as well as the arms race. Our position on this question is well known. However it is essential to state with all clarity that as long as the NATO bloc remains and as long as the militaristic circles carry out the arms race, our nation, along with the other participants of the Warsaw Pact, will strengthen this military alliance" ("Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," p 8).

In replying to questions of the weekly of the German Social Democratic Party VORWÄRTS, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "We do not want war and are not preparing for war. But the Soviet people out of their own bitter experience are aware of what enormous sacrifices can be caused among the population by the actions of an aggressor. And we all too frequently hear arguments from the other side on the readiness to make 'powerful, destructive anticipatory strikes,' and so forth not to take any defensive measures. Only outright slanderers can view this as preparations to attack anyone whatsoever."

Under the banner of internationalism, the military cooperation of the armies of the Warsaw Pact nations is growing stronger. The Soviet Armed Forces hold a worthy place in their battle formation. "We are internationalists!" state with pride the men of the nation of October and they honorably carry out their patriotic and international duty, sparing no effort in their military labor for the sake of strengthening the defense might of the socialist fatherland and the security of peoples throughout the world. In completing the exposition of the material on the subject, the propagandist should emphasize that the over 2 decades which have passed since the formation of the Warsaw Pact have convincingly affirmed the enormous significance of this new type of military political alliance. The defense might of the allied states unswervingly is the insurmountable obstacle on which are shattered the evil intrigues of international imperialism. "It must be said directly that while today mankind is closer to a lasting peace than ever before," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "this is above all the result of the decisive and consistent efforts by the socialist nations.... Relying on our economic and defense might, on the advantages of a socialist, planned economy, on cooperation with our brothers and allies, and on the successes of our peace-loving foreign policy, we look to the future with confidence and will calmly continue our cause" ("Leninskim Kursom," Vol 4, pp 413, 415).

Thus, Lenin's ideas on the international nature of defending the victories of socialism today serve as a strong factor in the solidarity of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and their armies, the men of which are honorably carrying out their duty of patriots and internationalists and are in constant combat readiness.

During the hours of independent study, the students are to study the work of V. I. Lenin "Speech at a Meeting of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment of 2 August 1918" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 37, pp 24-26), the USSR Constitution (Articles 28-32, 62-64, 69), the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Task of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materials XXV S"yezda KPSS," pp 5-11, 83), the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 18th Komso-mol Congress (PRAVDA, 26 April 1978), the report of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov "Sixty Years on Guard for the Victories of Great October" (PRAVDA, 23 February 1978), and the second chapter of the textbook for political exercises "V. I. Lenin o Zashchite Sotsialisticheskogo

Otechestva" [V. I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland] (Voyenizdat, 1977).

In preparing for the exercises, it is possible to use sheet 20 of the visual aids "XX S"yezd KPSS ob Ukreplenii Oborony SSSR" [The 25th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the Defense Might of the USSR] (Voyenizdat, 1976).

During the evening, it is desirable to organize the viewing of the documentary films "The Commonwealth," "Solidarity and Unity of Actions," and "And the Sons Grew Up," and the film strip "The Military Community of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Countries."

During the seminar exercise it is advisable to discuss the following questions: 1. V. I. Lenin on the significance of international solidarity in defending the victories of socialism. 2. The liberation mission of the Soviet army during the years of World War II. 3. The Warsaw Pact the military-political alliance of the nations of the socialist commonwealth. 4. To be loyal to international duty and to strengthen military cooperation and readiness are the honorable duty of the Soviet military.

Literature for Propagandists

1. V. I. Lenin, "Speech at a Meeting of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment of 2 August 1918," "Complete Collected Works," Vol 37, pp 24-26.
2. V. I. Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," "Complete Collected Works," Vol 37, pp 291-305.
3. "Programma KPSS" [Program of the CPSU], Politizdat, 1976, pp 11-13, 16-17, 19-25, 132-135.
4. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," Politizdat, 1976, pp 5-11, 83.
5. L. I. Brezhnev, "Velikiy Oktyabr' i Progress Chelovechestva" [Great October and the Progress of Mankind], report at the Ceremony of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Politizdat, 1977.
6. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress," PRAVDA, 26 April 1978.
7. D. F. Ustinov, "Sixty Years on Guard for the Victories of Great October," PRAVDA, 23 February 1978.
8. V. G. Kulikov, "A Reliable Bulwark of Peace and Socialism," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 May 1978.

9. "Vo Glave Zashchity Sovetskoy Rodiny" [At the Head of the Defense of the Soviet Motherland], essay on the activities of the CPSU during the years of the Great Patriotic War, Politizdat, 1975, pp 239-256.

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BOOK ON NATIONAL LIBERATION WARS REVIEWED

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[Review by Lt Col A. Vitkovskiy, candidate of military sciences, of the book "Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'nyye Voyny na Sovremennom Etape" (National Liberation Wars at the Present Stage), by Col Ye. I. Dolgoplov, candidate of philosophical sciences, Voenizdat, 1977, 158 pp, price 24 kopecks]

[Text] The present book published by Voenizdat is entitled "National Liberation Wars at the Present Stage." Each of its three chapters is devoted completely to a specific problem: The role of armed violence in the national liberation struggle of peoples and the social nature of national liberation wars; the methods of conduct and the conditions for the successful termination of national liberation wars; a critique of bourgeois, reformist and revisionistic concepts of armed violence in the course of national liberation revolutions. The designated range of questions shows the timeliness and complexity of the problem selected by the author. And, we feel, it has been basically successfully solved.

The theoretical basis of the book is the classics of Marxism-Leninism and above all the works of V. I. Lenin, the decisions of the CPSU, and the documents of the international communist movement. A merit is that the book provides a great deal of factual material which has been skillfully systematized.

V. I. Lenin repeatedly stressed the inseparable link of the socialist revolution with the national liberation movement. "...A socialist revolution," he said, "will be not only and not mainly a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each nation against their bourgeoisie, no it will be a struggle of all the colonies and nations suppressed by imperialism and all dependent nations against international imperialism" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 39, p 327). The entire course of historical development has emphasized this inspired prediction.

The reviewed book states that the colonial system was born and grew up on the grounds of unrestrained capitalist exploitation, continuous predatory wars, and the enslavement and plundering of other peoples. The suppressed peoples fought stubbornly against the colonialists. However, the forces of the opposing sides were unequal, and the colonial system of imperialism continued to exist.

The Great October Socialist Revolution caused a crisis in this system, but its collapse and downfall occurred after the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over German fascism and Japanese militarism. As was stressed at the International Scientific Theoretical Conference "Great October and the Modern Era," the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia opened up real prospects of a national liberation struggle for the suppressed colonial peoples. The defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism, the rise and growth of the world socialist system contributed to a powerful upsurge in the movement for national independence. This ultimately led to the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. While in 1919, some 72 percent of the world's territory and over 69 percent of its population were in colonial, semicolonial and dependent nations, and by 1938 this ratio was, respectively, 59.9 and 63.6 percent, by the end of the 1960's, colonies made up only 3.3 percent of the territory with less than 1 percent of the population of our planet. At present, more than 100 former colonies and semicolonies on all continents have attained national independence and have acquired state sovereignty.

In outlining the particular features of the liberation struggle of the peoples at the present stage, the author says that these features consist primarily in the fact that many nations have attained political and national independence as a result of a skillful combination of peaceful and military means of resisting the imperialist colonialists and the local reaction. However, the exploiters have never voluntarily abandoned the colonies and have been driven from them by force. For this reason, armed forms of struggle have held a dominant position.

At the same time, the founders of Marxism-Leninism never considered armed struggle the sole and obligatory method of liberating the peoples. The book gives the words of V. I. Lenin that Marxism, in the first place, "does not link the movement with any one definite form of struggle" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 14, p 1), and, secondly, "requires unconditionally an historic examination of the question of the forms of struggle. To place this question outside the specific historical situation means not to understand the rudiments of dialectical materialism" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 14, p 2).

The book states that from the second half of the 1950's, many nations attained independence both peacefully and by arms. At present, when in a number of nations the struggle against neocolonialism has developed mainly on the economic front, it has basically a peaceful nature. However, in this instance it is not excluded that the defense of the achieved victories by force of arms will be necessary in a certain situation.

The author has been completely correct in starting the examination of the question of the essence and content, the leading forces, the national and social aspects of the national liberation struggle from a Marxist-Leninist assessment of war. On this level, national liberation wars represent a continuation of a policy of national and social liberation of the peoples.

Its content is a mass movement of the indigenous population both against the suppressors within the nation as well as against the encroachments of the imperialists who have endeavored to restore colonial orders.

In the book the thesis has been well argued that the content and outcome of national liberation wars are greatly influenced by the balance of class forces. Since a broad spectrum of class forces is involved in these wars, they have a general democratic nature. Experience has shown that where the struggle is headed by the progressive forces, the liberated nations have adhered to a socialist orientation. However, in many instances the national bourgeoisie has been the leading force. These nations have predominantly followed a capitalist path of development.

Under present-day conditions, when there has been a fundamental change in the balance of forces on the world scene, and historic initiative has shifted into the hands of real socialism, the national liberation movement is beginning to be more and more closely linked with the theory of scientific socialism.

For example, in Asia and Africa, a large group of states has formed with a socialist orientation and a population of around 150 million persons and a territory of over 12 million km². These nations are in the vanguard of the national liberation struggle.

The monograph examines the difference in national liberation wars which have started as a revolt against colonial suppression and the national liberation wars of independent states in repelling imperialist aggression. In the first instance they are characterized by individual fluid battles over a vast territory, with the absence of a firm front and clearly expressed troop groupings, that is, basically by guerilla actions, as was the case in Cuba, Algeria and other countries. In the second instance, guerilla methods are effective, but are merely an auxiliary means of struggle on the enemy-occupied territory, while the basis of the struggle is made up of organized actions of the regular army, as occurred in Korea and Egypt.

Of particular interest are the pages dealing with the birth and development of the national armies. The author has had a creative approach to examining the development dialectics of the armed forces and the role of the army in the national liberation struggle of peoples.

The suppressed peoples, in commencing the struggle for their liberation, as a rule, did not possess their own armed forces, but create them directly in the course of the national liberation wars. And while in the past such armies developed spontaneously, on the basis of guerilla detachments, at present in many instances this process has a purposeful character, particularly under conditions where the Marxist-Leninist and national democratic parties direct the preparations for armed struggle.

From the examples of a number of nations, the author has shown the ways for organizing national armies. For example, in Algeria, Burma and Indonesia, they arose and grew up out of the guerilla and rebel detachments, while the

units and subunits of the former colonial troops served as the basis for the national armed forces of India, Syria, Sudan, Kenya and other nations.

The overall trend in the organization of armies from a majority of the liberated states, the book points out, has been their liberation from the control of the imperialist states and the turning of them into truly national ones. This conclusion is very timely.

In our age, armies are playing an ever greater role in the political life of the young states. This is explained by the specifics of the transitional period which these states are living through, as well as by the particular features of the development and socioclass structure of the young armies themselves, and by the change in their personnel. The position of the army largely determines the victory of the revolution, the strengthening of progressive power and the defense of the achieved victories. In those instances when the army is under the influence of reactionaries, the counter-revolution can with army help temporarily interrupt and impede revolutionary development.

The materials of the book show the uniqueness of the forming of armies in the liberated nations. This process bears the imprint of the socioclass nature of the liberated states, the degree of political and economic independence, the direction of development and other factors.

The monograph traces the trends and prospects for the growth of the revolutionary-democratic and patriotic influences in the young armies. As a whole their social structure reflects the social structure of the liberated states themselves.

At present, in a majority of instances national military cadres have come to leadership over the armed forces. There has been an increase in the group of officers who have come from the middle strata of the city and countryside and who are comparatively close to the masses of soldiers. The manning of the army in terms of rank and file has been carried out on the basis of universal military service. A number of states in their military development rely on the experience and selfless support of the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth. "In the person of the socialist countries," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "these states have reliable and dependable friends who are ready to give them all-possible aid and support in developing along a progressive path. This is not only moral and political support, but also economic and organizational, even up to aid in the strengthening of defenses."

One should also note the author's thought that the process of the organizing of the armed forces in the liberated nations is not restricted to purely the military sphere and depends upon the solution to a number of exceptionally important problems of a moral and political nature. The young armies ensure the carrying out of the posed missions if the soldiers and officers are clearly and precisely aware of their obligations in building

a new life and in defending revolutionary victories, and if they are constantly ready to make a decisive rebuff to any encroachments by imperialism and the domestic reaction.

The concluding chapter is devoted to a critique of bourgeois, reformist and revisionistic concepts. The ideologists of imperialism endeavor to distort the revolutionary liberation process, particularly the armed struggle of peoples against the colonialists and their supporters, to whitewash the predatory actions of the imperialist states, to lift the blame from the latter for starting wars against the freedom-loving peoples, and to spread lies and slander against the socialist countries. They have asserted that the colonial powers penetrated "peacefully" into the Third World nations, that they brought modern "civilization" to the underdeveloped peoples, and then "voluntarily" granted them independence.

In actuality, the creation of colonial empires occurred by continuous predatory wars and by the enslavement and barbarian extermination of entire peoples. From 1900 through 1923 alone, the book points out, the U.S. armed forces more than 30 times invaded Latin American territory, and over a little more than 150 years the U.S. capitalists participated in a total of 114 wars and organized almost 9,000 armed clashes. After World War II there was not a single year when the U.S. imperialists did not cause wars in one or another region of the world or did not interfere into the internal affairs of the liberated nations. According to certain American estimates, from 1946 through 1975, the United States used the armed forces 215 times for carrying out its foreign policy interests abroad and for preventing the rapid development of situations which were disadvantageous for the United States. In response to the violence of imperialism, the peoples were forced to take up arms and defend their rightful cause. This was the case in Vietnam, Laos, Angola and other states.

The bourgeois ideologists in every way have falsified the aims and policy of the communist parties vis-a-vis the national liberation wars, and they have endeavored to distort the content of the principle of peaceful co-existence among states with different social systems, to extend this to relations between the suppressed and the exploiters, and to gain from the socialist nations an abandonment of support for the liberation struggle.

The apologists of imperialism have endeavored to undermine the national liberation struggle of peoples from within. The brunt of propaganda has been directed at the "brainwashing" of the officer corps in the developing nations in order to keep them under control.

The book convincingly unmasks the fabrications of the bourgeois theoreticians and all sorts of revisionists aimed at discrediting the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the liberation movement and at justifying the armed intervention of the United States into the internal affairs of the nations where revolutionary changes are occurring.

The reviewed book has been written on a strictly scientific basis, in good, clear language. It will be of effective help to the military personnel in Marxist-Leninist education, and will attract the attention of a broad circle of readers.

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